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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613 allows a person who is dissatisfied by a 
decision of the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to "obtain judicial review 
by complying with the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act." 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court or 
Court of Appeals to review all final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative hearings. Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and Rule 14 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure confer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over the 
final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is Ms. Montierth ("Petitioner") precluded from raising issues of due 
process, statutory construction, and evidentiary errors by failing to raise 
them before the administrative hearing officer ("AHO")? 
2. If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise due process issues before the 
AHO, did the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") grant Petitioner 
constitutional procedural due process by granting her a formal 
administrative hearing? 
3. If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise due process issues before the 
AHO, does Petitioner have an individual property interest in her late 
husband's retirement benefit to invoke the due process clause? 
4. If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise statutory construction issues 
before the AHO, does the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-
405(2) grant Petitioner any retirement benefit as the spouse of a retiree? 
5. If Petitioner can survive her failure to raise evidentiary errors before the 
AHO, did the AHO err in admitting and considering Petitioner's hearsay 
testimony and interpreting the hearsay rule to preclude a finding of fact 
based solely on hearsay under Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10(3)? 
6. Was Mr. Montierth's signed and notarized retirement application valid 
and complete pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-402? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4) specifically enumerates the relief which this Court may grant on an 
appeal from a formal administrative hearing before the Board. Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-16(4) states: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a 
person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by one of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the 
agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as 
applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by 
any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by 
statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the 
agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and 
reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for 
the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
Mrs. Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") failed to point to any specific 
subsection for relief under Section 63-46b-16(4) where the Board erred. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has duly noted that "Because the standard of review under 
UAPA will vary based on the subsection the claim is brought under, we strongly 
encourage counsel to clearly identify under what section review is being sought 
and to make certain they identify the appropriate standard of review under that 
section^ King v. Industrial Com 'n of Utah, 850 P.2d 1281,1287 n.7 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993)(emphasis added). 
Even though Petitioner failed to point to the applicable error section under 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4), it seems axiomatic that Petitioner's issues she 
failed to raise before the administrative hearing officer should be reviewed de 
novo by this Court. 
However, on issues of fact, u[a]n agency's findings of fact . . . are accorded 
substantial deference and will not be overturned if based on substantial evidence, 
even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Murphy v. State 
Retirement Bd, 2004 UT App. 109, *1 (Ut. Ct. App. 2004), cert, denied, 94 P.3d 
929(July 19, 2004); quoting, Hurley v. Board of Review oflnd. Com 'n, 767 P.2d 
524, 526-27 (Utah 1988). "Substantial evidence is 'such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Id; quoting, 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(quotations and citations omitted). The Appellate Court does not conduct a 
de novo credibility determination or reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. 
v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's 
findings of fact be overturned if based on substantial evidence, even if another 
conclusion from the evidence is permissible. Hurley, 767 P.2d 524 at 526-27. It 
is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve conflicting 
evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, 
it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertsons Inc. v. Dept. of Employment 
Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah Ct App. 1993). 
Similarly, the Appellate Court will grant deference to the agency's 
interpretation or application of law when "there is a grant of discretion to the 
agency concerning the language in question, either expressly made in the statute or 
implied from the statutory language." Morton Int'n., Inc. v. Auditing Division, 
814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). "Where a grant exists, [the Appellate Court] will 
not disturb the agency's interpretation or application of the law unless its 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." King, 850 
P.2d 1281 at 1286. The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted such a grant of 
discretion broadly. See, Id, at 1288 (After reviewing examples of grants of 
discretion to agencies, the Court states, "In each case the language of the statute 
and the statutory scheme support a finding of at least an implicit grant of 
discretion."). 
Here, the legislature granted to the Board the general power to "develop 
broad policy for the . . . various . . . programs under broad discretion . . . , 
including the specific authority to interpret and define any provision or term under 
this title . . . [.]" Utah Code Ann. § 49-1 l-203(l)(k). Thus, since the Legislature 
granted express authority to the Board to make legal determinations under Utah 
Code Ann. Title 49, this Court should not disturb the Board's interpretations of 
law unless they "exceed the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." King, 850 
P.2d 1281 at 1286.1 
1
 Although the Court failed to grant deference to the Board's authority in its most 
recent case, the Court did so without considering the legislature's change to the 
* 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401 states, 
(1) A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this 
system when: 
(a) the member ceases actual work for a participating 
employer in this system before the member's retirement date and 
provides evidence of the termination; 
(b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized 
retirement application form that states the member's proposed 
retirement date; and 
(c) one of the following conditions is met as of the member's 
retirement date: 
(i) the member has accrued at least four years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 65 years; 
(ii) the member has accrued at least ten years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 62 years; 
(iii) the member has accrued at least 20 years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 60 years; 
(iv) the member has accrued at least 30 years of service credit; 
or 
(v) the member has accrued at least 25 years of service credit, 
in which case the member shall be subject to the reduction under 
Subsection 49-13-402(2)(b). 
(2) (a) The member's retirement date shall be the 1st or the 
16th day of the month, as selected by the member, but the 
retirement date must be on or after the date of termination. 
(b) The retirement date may not be more than 90 days before 
or after the date the application is received by the office. 
Board's statutory authority. See, Hilton v. State Retirement Bd, 2005 UT App 
408 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). The Court cited Epperson v. Utah State Retirement 
Bd., 949 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), but since the Epperson decision, and 
in response to the Epperson decision, the legislature has granted the Board express 
permission to make legal determinations concerning its applicable statutes. See, 
Id 
SUMMARY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Ms. Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") filed a Request for Board Action on 
March 21, 2005, requesting the Utah State Retirement Board (hereinafter "Board") 
grant her request "to honor the intention of Mr. Montierth and provide Plan 3 joint 
life benefits to Ms. Montierth." Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") at 6. A 
hearing was held on August 22, 2005, before the Administrative Hearing Officer 
(hereinafter "AHO"), James Barker, on Petitioner's Request for Board Action. 
Petitioner was represented by Rocky D. Crofts of Smith Knowles, P.C. The Board 
was represented by David B. Hansen. At the conclusion of the testimony, the 
AHO ruled in favor of the Board and directed Mr. Hansen, counsel for the Board, 
to draft a proposed Order. See, Hearing Transcript (hereinafter "HT") at 50:13. 
On August 31, 2005, David B. Hansen sent a letter to Rocky D. Crofts with the 
enclosed proposed order for his approval as to form, or in the alternative, 
directions to file objections to the order. See, HR 54. Rocky D. Crofts signed the 
order indicating that it was approved as to form. See, HR 59. The Order was then 
signed by the AHO on August 13, 2005. See, HR 58. The Board adopted the 
Final Order on October 13, 2005. See, Id, Petitioner then filed a Request for 
Board Reconsideration on October 27, 2005. See, HR 62. A Petition for Review 
of Administrative Order was filed by Petitioner on November 10, 2005. See, HR 
66. The Board filed a Response on December 8, 2005, denying Petitioner's 
request for reconsideration. See, HR 69. Petitioner filed her Petition for Review 
in this matter on October 14, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/ FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Wesley V. Montierth ("Mr. Montierth") was a member of the Public 
Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System ("PERS"). See, HR 47. 
PERS is administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("Office"). See, 
Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-201(l)(b). 
Prior to his retirement, Mr. Montierth contacted the Office concerning his 
retirement benefits and requested and received three Retirement Benefit 
Estimates ("Estimates"). See, HT 36:5-6, HR 50-53. These estimates were 
to assist Mr. Montierth in making his retirement decisions. 
In order to meet the eligibility requirements to retire with 30 years of 
service credit, Mr. Montierth made a purchase of future service credit 
amounting to $35,871.44, on July 2, 2002. See, HT 38:21-22, 39:18, 42:19-
20. 
On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for Service 
Retirement ("Application") with the Office for a July 16, 2002, retirement 
date. See,UR47. 
On his Application, Petitioner selected retirement "Plan 1." See, HT 37:7; 
HR47. 
On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth had his signature on his completed 
Application notarized by Ms. Ann Hancock Young, a retirement counselor, 
and submitted his application to the Office for processing. See, HR 47. 
Mr. Montierth expressly asserted by signing the Application: 
In accordance with the statutes governing the Utah Retirement 
Systems, I make application for retirement benefits. I understand the 
limitations as described on the reverse side of this form. I hereby 
certify that the information provided on this form and any of the 
attached forms is true correct, and complete to the best of my 
knowledge. 
Id. 
9. For 27 months, Mr. Montierth received and benefited from a Plan One 
retirement benefit which provided substantially more in retirement benefits 
than a Plan Three, or any other retirement plan benefit. See, HT 35:18-22. 
10. Petitioner testified at the hearing that Mr. Montierth "opted for one 
[retirement benefit] that paid out a little bit more higher up front." HT 
25:21-22. 
11. Mr. Montierth passed away on October 20, 2004, from an apparent suicide. 
See, HT 36:1-2. 
12. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Mr. Montierth. See, HT 5:7-10. 
13. At the administrative hearing before the AHO, Petitioner's sole argument 
was that her husband, Mr. Montierth, mistakenly selected retirement Plan 
One and meant to select retirement Plan Three on his Application. See, HT 
17:5-6. 
14. At the hearing, Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her own 
self-serving testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected retirement 
Plan One and meant to select another retirement plan on his Application. 
&e,HT 1:1-50:15. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Following a formal administrative hearing, Petitioner mistakenly raises due 
process, statutory construction, and evidentiary issues for the first time on appeal. 
Petitioner admits to the Court's general rule that the Appellate Court "will not 
consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal. . ." State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186, 189 (Utah 2004). See also, State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 (Utah 
App. 1991). This rule applies equally to administrative proceedings as district 
court proceedings. Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Corn'n of Utah, 947 
P.2d 671, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1997. Although this rule has exceptions, Petitioner 
fails to provide sufficient legal or factual analysis as to why she should be allowed 
to raise these claims under those exceptions. 
Utah Courts have only recognized two limited exceptions to the 
preservation rule - 1) "plain error" by the trier of fact, and 2) "exceptional 
circumstances." See e.g., State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 2006 WL 73758, at 3 
(Utah 2006); State v. Archambeau^ 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Petitioner 
can prove neither. 
First, Petitioner cannot prove plain error because she failed to show, '"(i) 
[a]n error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) 
the error is harmful.'" State v. Pecht, 2002 UT 41, % 18, 48 P.2d 931, 936 (Utah 
2002), quoting, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Far from being 
1A 
able to meet all these elements as required to invoke this exception, Petitioner 
cannot even meet one of the elements to invoke "plain error." As such, Petitioner 
cannot invoke the plain error exception to the preservation rule on her issues of 
due process, statutory construction, and evidentiary issues which were not raised 
before the AHO. 
Second, Petitioner does not qualify under the exceptional circumstances 
exception to the preservation rule because she cannot show any exception 
circumstance or "rare procedural anomaly" to invoke the exception. State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), quoting, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)(fmding exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-
defined, and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies...."). Thus, 
Petitioner cannot sustain a claim for the first time on appeal because she cannot 
meet either of the exceptions to the general preservation rule. 
Even if Petitioner could maintain a claim for violations of procedural due 
process without preserving the issue below, the Board granted Petitioner a formal 
administrative hearing where she was given wide latitude to present any claim for 
additional retirement benefits. Petitioner admits that at the formal hearing she 
received notice, obtained legal counsel, called witnesses, presented evidence, and 
cross-examined Board witnesses. See, Hearing Record (hereinafter "HR") 5, 
Hearing Transcript (hereinafter "HT") 3:1-3, 4:2-3, 16:2-4, 40-49. In fact, no 
allegation has been made, and indeed no credible allegation can be made, that the 
11 
Board did not follow its constitutional formal administrative proceedings to the 
letter in denying Petitioner's claim. 
But even if Petitioner could sustain a claim for procedural due process 
despite not raising it below and receipt of a formal administrative hearing, 
Petitioner has not been deprived of an individual vested property interest to invoke 
the due process clause. The Court has stated, "Under Utah law, public pension 
and retirement systems give rise to vested contractual rights'" Horn v. Utah Dep't 
of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah Ct App 1998)(emphasis added). A member of 
the retirement systems vests in his/her contractual rights when he meets all the 
conditions precedent to receive retirement benefits. See, Utah Public Employees 
Ass n. v. State of Utah, 2006 UT 9, ^29 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) citing, Horn, 962 
P.2d at 100. These vested contractual rights constitute a property interest. 
Conversely, those without vested contractual rights do not have a property interest 
in a retirement benefit. Because Petitioner did not have an individual vested 
contract right to any retirement benefit of her late husband, she also had no 
individual property right to such a benefit. As such, she cannot invoke the due 
process clause relating to deprivations of property. 
Similarly, despite not raising the issue before the AHO, Petitioner is not 
eligible for a benefit under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 because she misreads the 
plain language of the statute. After receiving a retirement benefit, Mr. Montierth 
was defined as a retiree, and not a member. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) states, 
"Upon the request of a deceased member's lawful spouse at the time of the 
n 
member ys death, the deceased member is considered to have retired under Option 
Three on the first day of the month following the month in which the member died 
. . ." . (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-102(22)(a) defines "member" 
as, "a person, except a retiree, with contributions on deposit with a system . . ." . 
(emphasis added). A "retiree" is defined as "an individual who has qualified for 
an allowance under this title." Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(34). Because Mr. 
Montierth, after receiving a retirement allowance, was a retiree, not a member, at 
the time of Mr. Montierth's death, Petitioner was a retiree's spouse, not a 
member's spouse. As such, Petitioner cannot prove entitlement to any additional 
benefit as the spouse of a retiree. 
Petitioner's allegations of evidentiary errors by the AHO were also not 
raised below and are precluded on appeal. Yet, even if these evidentiary issues 
had been properly preserved, the Board committed no error in admitting and 
considering all Petitioner's evidence and making a finding concerning Mr. 
Montiereth's intent to select a different retirement plan than plan one. Petitioner 
simply points to no credible evidence that the AHO made or failed to make any 
required finding of fact given her evidence. 
Even if Petitioner could point to some error in admitting evidence, such an 
error would be harmless error because Utah Code Ann. §49-11-607 precludes any 
finding for Petitioner. Subsection (1) states, "After the retirement date, which 
shall be set by a member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration, 
addition, or cancellation of a benefit may be made... ." Thus, even Mr. 
Montierth, let alone his spouse, could not change his retirement plan selection 
after his retirement date which he set in his application. 
Finally, the only issue Petitioner raised before the AHO that is not 
precluded from consideration before this Court under the preservation rule is 
whether Mr. Montierth's retirement application was legally complete. Utah Code 
Ann. §49-13-401 states, "A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this 
system when:. . . the member has submitted to the office a notarized retirement 
application form that states the member's proposed retirement date; . . ." The 
plain language of the statute dictates that in order to be accepted to effectuate 
benefits, a retirement application must contain: 1) a selection of a retirement date, 
and 2) a notarized signature of the member. It is undisputed that Mr. Montierth's 
application contained both a selection of a retirement date and a notarized 
signature of Mr. Montierth. Thus, his retirement application was complete and 
valid to effectuate his benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER FAILED TO RAISE THE MAJORITY OF HER APPELLATE 
ARGUMENTS AND ISSUES BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING 
OFFICER, THEREBY PRECLUDING HER FROM RAISING THEM FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
In her appeal to this Court, Petitioner wrongfully raises issues of 
constitutional due process, statutory interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 49-13-
405(2), and errors by the Administrative Hearing Officer ("AHO") which she 
failed to raise before the AHO.2 Petitioner admits to the Court's general rule that 
the Appellate Court "will not consider an issue brought for the first time on appeal 
. . ." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, 94 P.3d 186, 189 (Utah 2004). See 
also, State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1991). This rule applies equally to administrative 
proceedings as it does to district court proceedings. Brown & Root Indus. Service 
v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)("The rule 
that courts should not reach issues on review that were not raised before an 
administrative agency is so basic and necessary to orderly procedure that we will 
enforce it despite the lack of a timely objection by [either party.]"). This general 
rule has been of such importance to the Court that it has "been incorporated into 
the briefing requirements of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 24 
provides that each issue presented for review in an appellant's brief must cite to 
the record, showing that the issue was preserved in the trial cour t . . . . " State v. 
Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7, n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Even constitutional issues, like the 
due process issues alleged by Petitioner, cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. See e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 1991)("We 
conclude that a defendant may not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on 
appeal unless he can demonstrate 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances.'"); 
2
 The only issue Petitioner raised which she legitimately preserved below was her 
argument concerning the validity of Mr. Montierth's retirement application. This 
argument was of such minor importance to Petitioner that she spent only one 
paragraph, and five sentences on it. The Board's response to this argument is 
discussed infra at 45. 
Pratt v. City Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 
1981)(holding that the general preservation rule "applies equally to constitutional 
issues . . .") ; State v. Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah App. 1991). In addition, 
the Court stated the policy behind the general preservation rule as, "in the interest 
of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an opportunity to address a 
claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." State v. Eldredge^ 713 P.2d 29, 36 
(Utah 1989). See also, State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346, 350 (Utah 
2000). 
Utah Courts have only recognized two limited exceptions to this general 
rule - 1) "plain error" by the trier of fact, and 2) "exceptional circumstances." 
See e.g., State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, 2006 WL 73758, at *3 (Utah 2006); State v. 
Archamheaui 820 P.2d 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Although Petitioner correctly 
identified the two recognized exceptions to the Preservation Rule in her brief, she 
failed to point out which exception applied, or if they both applied, how they both 
applied to the facts of her case. In failing to identify the elements or legal analysis 
of either exception, Petitioner then wrongly implies that these two exceptions are 
really one and the same when using the singular noun "exception" in stating her 
3
 At least one Court has recognized a third exception to the general preservation 
rule - an ineffective assistance of counsel. See, Irwin, 924 P.2d at 7. However, 
this exception to the preservation rule was not raised by the Petitioner, does not 
apply in civil cases, and thus, not discussed further. See, Davis v. Grand County 
Serv. Area, 905 P.2d 888, 894 (Utah Ct.App.1995) ('The doctrine of ineffective 
assistance of counsel arises out of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and has no parallel in the civil context."). State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 
114,121, n.2, 61 P.3d 1062, 1067. 
"four reasons to invoke the exception'' Petitioner's Brief at 21. Petitioner 
compounds her misunderstanding of the law in suggesting that these exceptions 
are so broad that they "encompass any situation . . . in the interests of justice." 
Petitioner's Brief at 20. This is simply untrue. The Court has consistently 
reiterated that plain error and exceptional circumstances are two different 
exceptions, and that these exceptions are the only recognized exceptions to the 
general preservation rule. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, % 14, 2006 WL 73758, *3 
(Utah 2006). 
A. PETITIONER'S ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL FAIL TO MEET ANY OF THE 
REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF "PLAIN ERROR" TO INVOKE THIS EXCEPTION 
TO THE PRESERVATION RULE. 
Not only does Petitioner fail to meet all of the elements of the plain error 
exception as required to invoke this exception to the preservation rule, she cannot 
meet even one element of showing plain error. "To establish plain error, an 
appellant must demonstrate that '(i) [a]n error exists, (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful.'" State v. Pecht, 2002 
UT 41, If 18, 48 P.2d 931, 936 (Utah 2002), quoting, State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). "If any one of these requirements is not met, plain error is not 
established." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 (Utah 1993).4 
4
 Petitioner mistakenly opines that "manifest injustice" was the same as "plain 
error" by citing to State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989) and implies 
that this is the test for plain error. Petitioner's Brief at 20. This analysis is 
incorrect as applied to this case. What Petitioner failed to realize is that the Verde 
Court defined the parameters of the specific phrase "manifest injustice" found in 
1. PETITIONER FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE ANY ERROR BY THE AHO OR 
THE BOARD. 
First, Petitioner failed to specifically demonstrate that "an error exists." 
Petitioner's allegations of error by the Board which she failed to raise before the 
AHO are threefold: 1) procedural due process, 2) failure to follow Utah Code Ann. 
§49-13-405, 3) failure of AHO to decide all the issues by failing to consider 
evidence. In none of these instances did Petitioner demonstrate error by the 
Board.5 
Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and not the exception to the 
preservation rule. The Verde Court stated, "The question presented by the instant 
case is how the standard of 'manifest injustice,' made applicable to instructional 
errors through rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, fits within 
those categories of error." Id. Criminal Procedure Rule 19(c) deals with a lack of 
objections to jury instructions. This case, on the other hand, is a civil 
administrative case, and was not tried before a jury. In fact, after hearing 
argument that "manifest injustice" was a separate exception to the preservation 
rule, the Utah Supreme Court recently implied that the "manifest injustice" 
argument was limited to Rule 19(c) cases in stating, " . . . a remedy under rule 
19(c) is not available to Mr. Nelson-Waggoner because he has not contested any 
jury instructions." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, lj 26, 94 P.3d 186, 191 
(Utah 2004). 
Although Petitioner was incorrect in using the plain meaning of "manifest 
injustice" to argue for plain error exception, it is unclear whether this concept still 
may apply to the other exception to the preservation rule, "exceptional 
circumstances," discussed infra at 30. The confusion surrounding the term 
"manifest injustice" and the two preservation rule exceptions was expressly noted 
by the Court of Appeals in State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 10, n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996), and perhaps complicated further by the discussion of the Supreme Court in 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, ^|23, 94 P.3d 186, 191 (Utah 2004). What 
is clear from the Court rulings is that the plain meaning of "manifest injustice" is 
not the same as "plain error" to invoke the exception to the preservation rule. 
5
 "Demonstrating" error by the tribunal is different that "alleging" error. A 
"demonstration" that an error exists must have some merit in fact or law. 
Otherwise the entire policy behind the preservation rule is frustrated if Petitioner 
First, Petitioner failed to demonstrate a procedural due process error by the 
Board because she specifically received notice and opportunity to be heard at the 
administrative hearing held on August 22, 2005. See additional discussion, infra 
at 33. The Board granted Petitioner wide latitude at the hearing to present any 
issues where she believed she was wronged by the Board's decision denying her 
benefits. In fact, jurisdiction in this Court suggests that an administrative hearing 
was held below in which a Petitioner was granted notice and the opportunity to be 
heard. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16. As such, Petitioner cannot in any way 
demonstrate error by the AHO or the Board in failing to grant Petitioner 
procedural due process. 
Second, Petitioner cannot demonstrate an error by the AHO for failing to 
grant her a benefit under U.C.A. §49-13-405 because the plain language of the 
statute denies Petitioner a benefit as the spouse of a retiree. See, discussion, infra 
at 39. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) states, "Upon the request of a deceased 
member's lawful spouse at the time of the member's death, the deceased member 
is considered to have retired under Option Three on the first day of the month 
following the month in which the member died . . ." . (emphasis added). Utah 
Code Ann. §49-1 l-102(22)(a) defines "member" as, "a person, except a retiree, 
need only "argue" meritless claims for the first time on appeal because a Petitioner 
could strategically refuse to raise a potential issue just for the purpose of 
guaranteeing himself an overturned verdict on appeal. See argument concerning 
invited error infra at 23. 
1Q 
with contributions on deposit with a system . . .." (emphasis added). A "retiree" 
is defined as "an individual who has qualified for an allowance under this title." 
Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102(34). Thus, Mr. Montierth, after filing his application 
and receiving a retirement allowance, was a retiree, not a member. Similarly, at 
the time of Mr. Montierth's death, Petitioner was a retiree's spouse, not a 
member's spouse. The plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) clearly 
states that this benefit is only intended for a member's spouse, not a retiree's 
spouse. Thus, Petitioner failed to demonstrate any error by the AHO or the Board 
for not granting Petitioner a benefit under U.C.A. § 49-13-405. 
Third, Petitioner pointed to no specific error of law or fact on the part of the 
trier of fact, the AHO, in her section on waiver. See, Petitioner's Brief at 19-22. 
The closest Petitioner comes to alleging a specific error of law on something 
actually decided by the AHO was her argument that, "In essence, the ALJ and the 
Board ignored the 'hearsay' evidence . . . " of Mr. Montierth's intent to select a 
different retirement plan, and that this amounted to a "constitutional denial." 
Petitioner's Brief at 18. Of course, not only does Petitioner fail to point to any 
6
 As discussed infra at 39, Petitioner cannot excuse her blatant misreading of the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 by claiming she did not know that 
the term "member" was defined in Utah Code Ann. §49-11-102. Petitioner 
specifically pointed to this applicable definition section in her Brief at 8. Whether 
this oversight was deliberate or negligent, it is undoubtedly unreasonable. 
7
 The Petitioner also wrongly alleges that this hearsay testimony as evidence of 
Mr. Montierth's intent to select a different retirement plan was not "contested" by 
the Board. Petitioner's Brief at 18. The Board strongly disputes that Ms. 
Montierth's hearsay testimony was not "contested" by the Board. Mr. Montierth's 
notarized retirement application was admitted at the hearing and specifically 
shows his express intent to select retirement plan one. See, HR 47. 
on 
evidence that the AHO and/or the Board disregarded her hearsay testimony, but 
the Order's finding of fact No. 11 proves that the AHO and the Board specifically 
considered her hearsay statements when it expressly states, "Petitioner failed to 
provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly 
selected retirement Plan 1 . . . . " Board's Order, HR 56. In addition, the AHO at 
the hearing specifically alluded to Petitioner's hearsay testimony in setting forth 
one of the reasons for his ruling by stating, " . . . based on the fact that the only 
evidence that is given [regarding her husband's intent in selecting a retirement 
plan] is the petitioner's statement of what she was told... I can't see how I can do 
anything except rule for the Board . . . . " TR, 50:9-10 (emphasis added). Far from 
not considering Petitioner's evidence, the AHO failed to find Petitioner's evidence 
persuasive or determinative. 
In addition, Petitioner argues that her self-serving statements regarding Mr. 
Montierth's intent to select retirement plan three were not "hearsay" because they 
"were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted . . . " Petitioner's Brief 
at 17. However, Petitioner then contradicts this statement in the next page in 
arguing that these statements were not "contested" by the Board and are therefore 
"binding upon all parties." Petitioner's Brief at 18. Such as argument admits that 
Petitioner's hearsay statements were to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
o 
In fact, Petitioner admits that her hearsay testimony was admitted by the AHO 
without objection. Petitioner's Brief at 18. It should not be a surprise to the Court 
that the Board did not object to Petitioner's hearsay testimony regarding her late 
husband's statements at the hearing since hearsay is admissible in administrative 
proceedings. See, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8(l)(c). 
Petitioner's counsel argued just so at the hearing in stating, "We will 
substantiate [Mr. Montierth's intent to select a different retirement plan] by 
testimony from Ms. Montierth that will show she had knowledge of Mr. 
Montierth's intention and that he, his actions were consistent with him choosing 
plan three as opposed to plan one." HT 2:22-25. In fact, this was Petitioner's only 
argument at the hearing as to why she was due a benefit. Thus, Petitioner cannot 
claim her hearsay evidence should be used one way at the administrative hearing, 
then claim it was being used to demonstrate something different on appeal. In any 
event, the AHO impliedly ruled that the testimony was hearsay, and this was not 
error. See9TR 50:9-10, HR 58. 
Although not an error of law, Petitioner also alleges that the AHO erred by 
not making a finding of fact regarding her husband's "actual belief as to whether 
he intentionally deprived Petitioner of his retirement benefit.9 Petitioner's Brief, 
9
 As to the findings of fact, even if properly objected to at the hearing, Petitioner 
may only be granted relief on appeal from a finding of fact, or lack thereof, if, on 
the basis of the factual record, the court determines that she has been prejudiced 
by Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or 
reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Com % 850 P.2d 
1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if 
based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is 
permissible. Hurley v. Board of Review of Indus. Com yn, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 
(Utah 1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertons Inc. v. 
Department of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993). 
Here, the Petitioner asks this Court to create a finding of fact without any 
suggestion about what such a finding may look like. The extension of this 
at 17. But Petitioner contradicts herself on the following page in implying the 
Board erred in making finding of fact No.l 1 stating, "Petitioner failed to provide 
any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected 
retirement Plan 1 and meant to select another retirement plan on his Application." 
Petitioner's Brief, at 18. Because of Petitioner's contradictory statements, the 
Board is then left to attempt to divine Petitioner's actual objection or claimed error 
since on the one hand Petitioner claims the Board failed to make a specific finding 
of fact of intent, and on the other hand, she claims the Board's finding of fact on 
intent was error. In any event, the Board correctly decided all the relevant issues 
raised by Petitioner and this was not error. 
Because Petitioner failed to demonstrate any actual error of law or fact by 
the AHO, she cannot meet even the first prong of the plain error exception. 
2. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, ANY ERROR BY THE AHO AND THE BOARD WAS 
INVITED ERROR. 
Even if Petitioner is determined to have made some valid claim of an error 
of law or fact by the AHO, such an alleged error was "invited error." Recently, 
the Utah Supreme Court, after discussing the elements of the "plain error" 
exception, stated, 
assertion would put the appellate court in the place of the AHO to weigh the 
testimony and make findings without being present. Thus, Petitioner's implication 
that the Board failed in any way in making a finding of fact is clearly erroneous. 
oa 
E>ut under the doctrine of invited error, we have declined to engage in even 
plain error review when "counsel either by statement or act, affirmatively 
represented to the [trial] court that he or she had no objection to the 
[proceedings].'5State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 P.3d 111; accord 
Finder, 2005 UT 15,1j 62, 114 P.3d 551; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
16, U 9, 86P.3d742. 
Our invited error doctrine arises from the principle that 'a party cannot take 
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error." Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^  9, 86 P.3d 742 
{quoting, State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)); accord 
Finder, 2005 UT 15, If 62, 114 P.3d 551; Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54, 70 
P.3d 111. By precluding appellate review, the doctrine furthers this 
principle by "discouraging] parties from intentionally misleading the trial 
court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal." 
Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ f 12, 86 P.3d 742 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ffif 14-15, 2006 WL 73758 (Utah 2006). 
Here, Petitioner cannot claim due process, statutory interpretation, or that 
the AHO erred in making, or failing to make, a finding of fact or a conclusion of 
law to invoke the plain error rule without running afoul of the "invited error" 
doctrine. 
Following his ruling at the hearing, the AHO requested counsel for the 
Board prepare an Order consistent with his ruling. See, HT 50:13. Counsel for the 
Board drafted the Order and, with a cover letter, sent it to Petitioner's counsel for 
approval as to form. See, HR 54. Petitioner's attorney, Rocky Crofts, of the law 
firm of Smith Knowles, P.C., who represented Petitioner at the hearing, approved 
the Order as to form by signing the Order without changes, and returned it to the 
Board for approval. See, HR. 59. By failing to file objections to the proposed 
order and signing the order as to form, Petitioner affirmatively waived any issues 
1A 
surrounding alleged errors by the AHO on appeal. If Petitioner truly believed that 
error was committed under the due process clause, statutory interpretation, or by 
the AHO in making or failing to make a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, she 
had ample opportunity to object to the Order before approving it as to form, but 
failed to do so. As such, Petitioner's claim of an exception to the preservation rule 
for plain error fails because any alleged error was affirmatively invited by 
Petitioner. 
3. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR ARE NOT PLAIN. 
Petitioner cannot meet the plain error exception to the preservation rule 
because any error by the AHO was not plain. The second prong of the plain error 
exception to the preservation rule is that the alleged error must be "plain" or 
"obvious" to the fact finder, the AHO. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Court has stated regarding this element, "from our 
examination of the record, we must be able to say that it should have been obvious 
to a trial court that it was committing error." Id. Thus, in order to sustain a claim 
for procedural due process which was not raised below, Petitioner must show that 
the AHO or the Board should have recognized that they had violated Petitioner's 
due process rights in granting her an administrative hearing. Of course Petitioner 
never explains, and it certainly begs the question, how an AHO could find an 
"obvious" error of a failure of notice and opportunity to be heard in the midst of a 
formal administrative hearing. Indeed, one of the reasons for administrative 
hearings is to grant procedural due process. Without argument to preserve the 
issue, any claimed error of procedural due process would not be plain. 
Similarly, a claim for benefits under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 to the 
spouse of a retiree would also not be plain absent argument. It seems axiomatic 
that in a civil case in which a party fails to state a cause of action or argue under a 
statute at a hearing/trial, that party cannot sustain a claim for what they wished 
they had claimed before the fact finder for the first time on appeal. If a Petitioner 
could prevail this way, it would effectively eviscerate any ability of a trial court or 
hearing officer to decide cases and controversies if the tribunal must decide not 
only the issues a Petitioner actually raises, but also the issues that a Petitioner 
might potentially raise. Although there are some legal issues which arise in 
trials/hearing so frequently as to be said to be "plain" to the fact finder, the Board 
is unaware of any other individual ever arguing, like Petitioner, for a continuing 
benefit under Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 to the spouse of a retiree. Because of 
Petitioner's novelty of an argument under this section, such an argument cannot be 
said to haive been obvious to the AHO. 
Finally, even if the Petitioner establishes error by the AHO in failing to 
"consider" Petitioner's hearsay evidence, such an alleged error would not have 
been "obvious" to the AHO because even in administrative hearings, hearsay 
evidence cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-
10(3). Thus, no finding of fact could have been made based solely on the 
Petitioner's hearsay testimony of Mr. Montierth's intent in choosing a retirement 
plan. Furthermore, Utah retirement statutes specifically do not allow for the Board 
to look beyond the retirement application to determine a member's "intent" at the 
time of retirement. See, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401. Thus, even if Petitioner 
demonstrates some error by the AHO to meet the first prong of the plain error test, 
she cannot claim that this error was "plain." 
4. PETITIONER'S ALLEGATIONS OF ERROR ARE HARMLESS. 
Finally, even if Petitioner can sustain a claim of error by the AHO without 
specificity and can overcome her invited error in failing to object to the Board's 
Order, the alleged error by the AHO was harmless to Petitioner. The Court has 
explained this third element of the plain error exception as "absent the error, there 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or 
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined." State v. Dunn, 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
First, Petitioner's allegation that the AHO or the Board violated her due 
process guarantees is not harmful error because the remedy for a failure of 
procedural due process is to grant a hearing complying with procedural due 
process. Petitioner already obtained a formal administrative hearing before the 
AHO. Thus, the Board committed no harmful error in granting Petitioner a formal 
administrative hearing. 
Second, Petitioner's claim that the AHO failed to consider her hearsay 
evidence, or that her testimony of Mr. Montierth's intent was not hearsay was 
harmless error because no one, not even Mr. Montierth could have changed Mr. 
Montierth's retirement selection two years after his retirement date. Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-11-607(1) mandates, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by a 
member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or 
cancellation of a benefit may be made . . . ."10 (emphasis added), Thus, hearsay or 
Section 49-11-607(1) provides for three exceptions, but none of the stated 
exceptions apply to Petitioner's situation. Furthermore, Petitioner did not argue 
that any of the exceptions applied either before the AHO or in her Brief to this 
Court, and as such is precluded from now raising argument under these sections. 
Section 49-11-607 states in full: 
(1) After the retirement date, which shall be set by a member in the 
member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or cancellation of a 
benefit may be made except as provided in Subsections (2), (3), and (4) or other 
law. 
(2) (a) Errors in the records or in the calculations of the office which result 
in an incorrect benefit to any member, retiree, participant, covered individual, 
alternate payee, or beneficiary shall be corrected by the office if the correction 
results in a modification of the benefit amount of $1 or more. 
(b) Future payments shall be made to any member, retiree, participant, 
covered individual, alternate payee, or beneficiary to: 
(i) pay the benefit to which the member or beneficiary was entitled; or 
(ii) recover any overpayment. 
(3) (a) Errors in the records or calculation of a participating employer 
which result in an incorrect benefit to a member, retiree, participant, covered 
individual, alternate payee, or beneficiary shall be corrected by the participating 
employer. 
(b) If insufficient employer contributions have been received by the office, 
the participating employer shall pay any delinquent employer contributions, plus 
interest under Section 49-11-503, required by the office to maintain the system, 
plan, or program affected on an actuarially sound basis. 
(c) If excess contributions have been received by the office, the 
contributions shall be refunded to the participating employer or member which 
paid the contributions. 
(4) If a dispute exists between a participating employer and a member at the 
time of the member's retirement which will affect the member's benefit 
calculation, and notice of the dispute is given to the office prior to the calculation 
of a member's benefit, the benefit may be paid based on the member's retirement 
date and the records available and then recalculated upon settlement of the dispute. 
no hearsay, under law, even the retiree could not change a benefit option after his 
retirement date, let alone the retiree's spouse. In fact, Petitioner admits that the 
alleged error by the AHO will not likely allow for a more favorable outcome for 
her. She stated, "With respect to the evidentiary record, the Utah State Retirement 
Board failed to decide a critical issue, or silently assumed it adversely to Appellant 
...." Petitioner's Brief at 17 (emphasis added). This admission that the AHO 
would not find in her favor even if the AHO had decided her stated issue, 
undercuts her claim of plain "harmful" error. As a result, Petitioner's alleged error 
of failing to consider hearsay evidence, although belied by the plain language of 
the order,11 is not harmful error. 
Hence, because Petitioner cannot prove harmful error nor challenge a silent 
finding of fact, her arguments not preserved below are precluded under the general 
preservation rule. Petitioner cannot invoke the plain error exception to the 
preservation rule because she cannot meet even one element of the exception for 
any of her arguments, let alone all three which are required to invoke the 
exception. 
11
 At best, Petitioner's claim is that silence by the Board concerning Petitioner's 
hearsay evidence constitutes non-consideration. Of course, Petitioner provides no 
support for such an obviously erroneous proposition. 
B. PETITIONER'S ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL ARE NOT "EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES" IN WHICH TO INVOKE THIS EXCEPTION TO THE 
PRESERVATION RULE. 
Similar to the plain error analysis, Petitioner failed to demonstrate any 
"exceptional circumstances" to invoke an exception to the general rule that an 
issue is waived on appeal if not preserved before the trier of fact,. Although the 
Court has characterized this exception as "ill-defined", State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993), the Court of Appeals, in State v. Irwin, attempted to 
glean from the common law the principles on which the "exceptional 
circumstances" exception applies, concluding, "With the possible exception of an 
aberration or two, 'exceptional circumstances' is a concept that is used sparingly, 
properly reserved for truly exceptional situations, for cases . . . involving 'rare 
procedural anomalies.'" Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah Ct App. 1996), quoting, 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209, n.3 (Utah 1993)(finding exceptional 
circumstances exception is "ill-defined, and applies primarily to rare procedural 
anomalies . . . " ) ; See also, State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 23, 94 P.3d 
186, 191 (Utah 2004)(holding, identically to Irwin, that exceptional circumstances 
only applies "sparingly" and in the "most unusual circumstances"); State v. 
McCloud, 2005 UT 466, If 14, 126 P.3d 775, 778-79 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
Petitioner also failed to point to any unusual circumstance which rises to the 
level of "extraordinary importance" or "widespread interest" to invoke the 
exceptional circumstances exception. Irwin, 924 P.3d at 11. " . . . [n]ot in every 
case with some peculiar twist will appellate courts invoke the 'exceptional 
circumstances' label and reach an issue otherwise impervious to appellate review." 
Id, at 8. Even constitutional questions such as due process have not been deemed 
of "extraordinary importance" or "widespread interest" to invoke the exception. 
See e.g., State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 925 (Utah 1991)("We conclude that 
a defendant may not assert a constitutional issue for the first time on appeal unless 
he can demonstrate 'plain error' or 'exceptional circumstances.'"); Pratt v. City 
Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 173-74 (Utah 1981)(holding that the 
general preservation rule "applies equally to constitutional issues"); State v. 
Buford, 820 P.2d 1381, 1384 (Utah App. 1991) ("This court has previously 
declined to consider Utah constitutional arguments because '[nominally alluding 
to such different constitutional guarantees without any analysis before the trial 
court does not sufficiently raise the issue to permit consideration by this court on 
appeal.'" quoting, State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah App. 1989)). 
Here, Petitioner cannot point to any exceptional circumstance or "rare 
procedural anomaly" to invoke this exception. Changes in law or in settled 
interpretation of law following a hearing/trial are the types of "rare procedural 
anomalies" which the Court accepts as exceptional circumstances under this rule. 
See, e.g. State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)(overturning conviction for 
12
 Although Petitioner advances her "four reasons to invoke the exception" that 
seem at least modestly to apply to the exception, none of Petitioner's excuses have 
ever been recognized by any court as being exceptional enough to invoke the 
exception. See, Irwin for a discussion on the doctrine. 
crime not recognized in Utah following recent Supreme Court decision); State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)(allowing defendant to make argument before 
the Supreme Court not preserved before trial court, but was basis of decision by 
Court of Appeals); State v. McCloud, 2005 UT 466, If 14, 126 P.3d 775, 778-79 
(Utah Ct. App. 2005)(finding that change in law colored failure to raise issue at 
trial). This list of cases is illustrative to show that the most common procedural 
irregularity recognized as an exceptional circumstance is "where a change in law 
or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have raised an issue at 
trial.11 Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10. Petitioner failed to point to any recent change in the 
law in this case. 
Additionally, the court uses this rule in an attempt to allow for fairness when 
there is some legitimate reason why a party failed to raise an issue before the 
AHO/trial court. In her Brief, Petitioner failed to, and indeed, cannot point to, 
any reason, either rare or common, either procedural or substantive, why she failed 
to preserve any constitutional procedural due process, statutory interpretation of 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-403, or AHO error issues before the AHO. Because she 
simply cannot prove any rare procedural anomaly to invoke the exceptional 
circumstances exception, she is precluded from arguing issues not raised before 
the AHO for the first time on appeal. 
II. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE BOARD GRANTED PETITIONER 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY GRANTING HER A FULL 
AND FAIR HEARING. 
1 *\ 
Even if the Court allows Petitioner to raise due process issues she failed to 
raise before the AHO, the Board afforded Petitioner complete procedural due 
process by allowing her to contest the denial of continuing retirement benefits at a 
hearing.14 Strangely, Petitioner alleges the Board failed to grant her notice and 
opportunity to be heard following a formal administrative hearing in which 
Petitioner admits she received notice, obtained legal counsel, called witnesses, 
presented evidence, and cross-examined Board witnesses. See, HR 5, HT 3:1-3, 
4:2-3, 16:2-4, 40-49. In fact, no allegation has been made, and indeed no credible 
allegation can be made, that the Board did not follow its constitutional formal 
administrative proceedings to the letter in denying Petitioner's claim. 
Even Petitioner's claim that she was denied a chance to be heard at the time 
of her husband's retirement election makes no cognitive sense as a procedural due 
process claim. Such a claim would only arise if the Board had argued that 
13
 Utah courts have interpreted the federal due process guarantees identically to the 
state due process guarantees. "Because 'Utah's constitutional guarantee of due 
process is substantially the same as the due process guarantees contained in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution,' In re 
Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996), we need not undertake separate federal 
and state analysis." Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 
964 P.2d 335, 346, n. 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
14
 Petitioner made no explicit argument regarding a violation of substantive due 
process. Although not expressly enumerated, her argument that she was denied 
"notice and the opportunity to be heard" are procedural due process claims. 
Petitioner's Brief at 11-14. The Board refuses to speculate on any substantive due 
process claims which Petitioner believes she may have but failed to raise in her 
Brief. 
Petitioner could not present issues of Mr. Montierth's intent in selecting a 
retirement plan at a hearing. In this case, the Board granted Petitioner wide 
latitude to present any and all issues regarding Mr. Montierth's intent to make a 
selection of a retirement plan at the hearing. Yet, even if she was denied a 
procedural due process right, a dubious claim at best, Petitioner's remedy would 
be to receive a hearing on the merits. One must wonder what kind of harm 
Petitioner believes that she has suffered by not being able to bring a claim at the 
time her husband made his retirement plan election since she was able to bring her 
claim to challenge her husband's retirement plan election after her husband died. 
By doing so Petitioner actually received more benefits by waiting until after 
her husband died to contest her husband's retirement plan selection, since her 
husband's election paid a higher benefit than the plan she is requesting. 
Hence, all the evidence points to the fact that Petitioner received all the 
process she was due through the administrative hearing process in participating in 
a hearing before the AHO. As such, this Court should deny Petitioner's 
procedural due process claim of a lack of notice and opportunity to be heard. 
III. EVEN IF PETITIONER CAN SURVIVE HER FAILURE TO RAISE DUE PROCESS 
ISSUES BEFORE THE AHO, AND EVEN IF THIS COURT FINDS SOME 
UNCLAIMED FAILURE BY THE BOARD TO GRANT HER PROCEDURAL DUE 
PROCESS, PETITIONER MAINTAINS NO INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY INTEREST 
IN HER LATE HUSBAND'S RETIREMENT BENEFIT TO INVOKE THE DUE 
PROCESS CLAUSE. 
Neither common law, nor the unambiguous retirement statutes in Utah Code 
Ann. Title 49, grant Petitioner any individual property right or an individual 
"vested right" to a retirement benefit as the spouse of a retiree. As such, Petitioner 
cannot sustain a due process claim for deprivation of property because she has not 
been deprived of any property interest. 
The Court has stated, "Under Utah law, public pension and retirement systems 
give rise to vested contractual rights" Horn v. Utah Dep 't of Public Safety, 962 
P.2d 95 (Utah Ct App 1998). A member of the retirement systems vests in his/her 
contractual rights when he meets all the conditions precedent to receive retirement 
benefits. See, Utah Public Employees Ass yn. v. State, 2006 UT 9, [^29 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2006)(citing, Horn, 962 P.2d at 100), See, also, Driggs v. Utah State 
Teachers Retirement Bd., 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). These vested contractual 
rights constitute a property interest. Conversely, those without vested contractual 
rights do not have a property interest in a retirement benefit. 
Petitioner's reliance on Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982) 
and other divorce or equitable distribution of marital property cases is misplaced 
to show that Petitioner has an individual property interest in her late husband's 
retirement benefit. Although the Court has recognized that non-vested retirement 
benefits of an employee spouse may be included in a marital estate and divided 
equitably by the Court in a divorce action, the Court has consistently stopped short 
of calling such expectancy interests "property." See, Woodward, 656 P.2d 431. 
Even more specifically, the Court has never held that such expectancy interests are 
individual "property" held by the non-employee spouse. 
Instead, the Court has repeatedly declared that retirement rights accrued 
during a marriage are part of the marital estate, and that a non-employee spouse in 
a divorce action may receive an equitable portion of retirement rights, not 
property, when those rights are being equitably divided. See, Id. at 432-433, "[t]he 
essential criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has accrued in whole or 
in part during the marriage. To the extent that the right as so accrued it is subject 
to equitable distribution."(emphasis added.). Id., See, also, Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In fact, the Court does not 
require a present value distribution of retirement benefits at the time of divorce, as 
some other states require. In Utah, the Court mandates merely that retirement 
rights accrued during the marriage, like future business earnings which can also be 
split upon divorce, be apportioned to both divorcing parties equally. Without a 
court's division of such rights upon a divorce, no separate individual property 
right exists outside of the employee's right to a benefit. The legislature recognized 
this rule in Utah Code Ann. §49-1 l-612(3)(a) which states, "The office shall 
provide for the division of an allowance, defined contribution account, continuing 
monthly death benefit, or refund of member contributions upon termination to 
former spouses and family members under an order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction with respect to domestic relations matters on file with the office." 
(emphasis added). Thus, only if the Court specifically grants an equitable 
distribution of retirement rights pursuant to a divorce or similar proceeding and 
the employee becomes vested in those contractual rights, does a spouse have a 
separate, individual right to retirement benefits outside the employee. Absent the 
Court splitting the retirement benefit and vesting by the employee, no separate, 
individual retirement right is created with a spouse. 
Here, because the Montierths did not divorce, and no equitable division of 
retirement rights took place pursuant to a valid DRO, Petitioner maintains no 
individual property interest in her late husband's retirement benefit. 
As Petitioner admitted in her Brief, in order to prevail on a claim for due 
process, she must prove some deprivation of a property interest. Petitioner's 
Brief, at 7-8. 
The retirement statutes are unambiguous concerning the conditions precedent 
to receive a retirement benefit, or in other words, to vest in a property interest. For 
the Public Employees' Noncontributory System, Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401l5 
states, 
(1) A member is qualified to receive an allowance from this 
system when: 
(a) the member ceases actual work for a participating 
employer in this system before the member's retirement date and 
provides evidence of the termination; 
(b) the member has submitted to the office a notarized 
retirement application form that states the member's proposed 
retirement date; and 
(c) one of the following conditions is met as of the member's 
retirement date: 
15
 Each retirement system governed by the Utah Retirement Systems contains a 
different section on the conditions a member must meet to qualify for benefits. 
The Board quotes from the system in which Mr. Montierth participated, and which 
Petitioner wishes she participated - the Public Employees' Noncontributory 
System - Utah Code Ann. Title 49, Chapter 13. 
(i) the member has accrued at least four years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 65 years; 
(ii) the member has accrued at least ten years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 62 years; 
(iii) the member has accrued at least 20 years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 60 years; 
(iv) the member has accrued at least 30 years of service 
credit; or 
(v) the member has accrued at least 25 years of service credit, 
in which case the member shall be subject to the reduction under 
Subsection 49-13-402(2)(b). 
(2) (a) The member's retirement date shall be the 1st or the 
16th day of the month, as selected by the member, but the 
retirement date must be on or after the date of termination. 
(b) The retirement date may not be more than 90 days before 
or after the date the application is received by the office. 
(emphasis added). 
From this section, it is clear that only a "member" can obtain individual vested 
contractual rights, and thus an individual properly interest in a retirement benefit. 
In addition, only a "member" can submit a retirement application, and only a 
member can select a retirement date. "Member" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§49-1 l-102(23)(a) as "a person, except a retiree, with contributions on deposit 
with a system... ."16 It is undisputed that Petitioner did not have contributions on 
deposit with the Public Employees' Noncontributory Retirement System. Because 
16
 Petitioner erroneously claims that a "'member' includes a spouse of retiree. 
Section 49-11-609." Petitioner's Brief at 8. The section Petitioner cites to states, 
"As used in this section, 'member' includes . . . a spouse of a retiree." Utah Code 
Ann. §49-11-609. Petitioner then attempts to apply this definition of "member" to 
the entire Title 49 when it is specifically limited to this "section" of the Code. 
Petitioner cannot even use the excuse that she did not know of the definition of 
"member" contained in Section 49-11-102 which does not apply to the entire title, 
since she specifically cited to that section in the immediate preceding sentence. 
See, Petitioner's Brief, at 8. 
Petitioner is not a "member," as defined, she cannot meet the conditions precedent 
to obtain a vested right, and thus maintains no individual property interest in her 
husband's retirement benefit. At best, prior to Mr. Montierth's retirement, 
Petitioner was a potential future beneficiary of Mr. Montierth. Such a speculative 
potential contract right is not a property interest. See, Utah Public Employees 
Ass 'n. v. State, 2006 UT 9 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). After Mr. Montierth's 
retirement and selection of a retirement plan with no continuing benefit to his 
spouse, Petitioner had no relationship with the retirement office at all. Thus, 
Petitioner cannot sustain any claim of due process against the Board for 
deprivation of property because at no point in time did Petitioner have an 
individual property interest in her late husband's retirement benefit. 
IV. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, EVEN IF PETITIONER PROPERLY PRESERVED THE 
ISSUE FOR APPEAL, THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANN. §49-13-
405(2) FAILS TO GRANT PETITIONER ANY RETIREMENT BENEFIT AS THE 
SPOUSE OF A RETIREE. 
For the first time on appeal, Petitioner wrongly argues that the Board failed 
to follow the "spirit and letter [sic] o f Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2). Because 
Petitioner failed to raise this argument before the AHO, she is precluded from 
bringing this issue before this Court. See, discussion supra at 14. However, even if 
the Court chooses to review this issue, it would find that the Board followed the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405(2) which explicitly does not apply 
to the spouse of a "retiree." 
Utah courts have consistently held that "when faced with a question of 
statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute." CIG 
Exploration, Inv. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995). 
Furthermore, "The courtfs principal duty in interpreting statutes is to determine 
legislative intent, and the best evidence of legislative intent is the plain language 
of the statute." Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 
1993); (citings Jens en v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
1984). A court will only seek guidance from legislative history or policy 
considerations when there is an ambiguity in the statute's plain language. See, 
CIG, 897 P.2d 1214 at 1216. "The fact that the parties offer differing 
constructions of the statute, in and of itself, does not mean that the statute is 
'ambiguous.' 'Ambiguous' means capable of 'two or more plausible meanings."' 
Derbidge v. Mutual Protective Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(citations omitted). 
The policy behind this statute is also plain. Those members with long-term 
service to the public who die not having retired and selected a retirement plan 
option, are allowed a continuing benefit to their spouse. Meanwhile, those retirees 
who had the option at retirement of selecting a continuing benefit to their spouse, 
are not given a second option of a continuing benefit to their spouse at death. In 
fact, adopting Petitioner's faulty interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 
would frustrate the actuarial soundness of offering different retirement options, 
because every member would select a non-continuing benefit plan at the time of 
retirement and then allow their spouse to convert to a continuing benefit, if 
necessary, upon their death. 
Finally, one wonders why Petitioner brought this argument after conceding 
that this statute is designed "only for employees who die [sic] before they actually 
retired." Petitioner's Brief at 15. In addition, Petitioner's assertion that the Board 
violated "the spirit" of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405, is an implied, if not a 
specific, admission that the plain language of the statute fails to grant Petitioner a 
benefit. Petitioner's Brief at 14. Thus, Petitioner can make no legitimate 
argument that Petitioner should be granted a benefit under the plain language of 
Utah Code Ann. §49-13-405 because Petitioner's husband elected to retire and 
was thus a retiree and not a member. 
V. EVEN IF NOT BARRED BY THE PRESERVATION RULE, THE AHO CORRECTLY 
CONSIDERED PETITIONER'S EVIDENCE, INCLUDING HEARSAY EVIDENCE, IN 
DETERMINING UNDER TITLE 49 THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO QUALIFY 
FOR ANY CONTINUING RETIREMENT BENEFIT FROM HER LATE HUSBAND'S 
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT. 
Even if not barred by the preservation rule or the invited error doctrine 
discussed supra at 17 & 24, the AHO did not err in admitting Petitioner's hearsay 
evidence or ruling that Petitioner failed to prove an entitlement to a continuing 
retirement benefit under Title 49. Petitioner failed to point to any proof that the 
AHO did not consider her evidence presented or that the AHO failed to decide any 
legitimate issues raised at the hearing. 
First, Petitioner's allegation that the AHO failed to consider her self-
serving hearsay testimony must fail because of a complete lack of evidence. The 
Order's finding of fact No. 11 shows that the AHO and the Board specifically 
admitted and considered Petitioner's hearsay statements when it states, "Petitioner 
failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. Montierth 
mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 . . . . " Board's Order, HR 56 (emphasis 
added). In addition, the AHO specifically alluded to Petitioner's hearsay 
testimony in setting forth one of the reasons for his ruling by stating, " . . . based 
on the fact that the only evidence that is given [regarding her husband's intent in 
selecting a retirement plan] is the petitioner's statement of what she was told . . . I 
can't see how I can do anything except rule for the Board . . . . " TR, 50:9-10. 
Petitioner points to nothing to show that the AHO or the Board failed to admit or 
consider her self-serving hearsay statements. Thus, no credible argument can be 
made that the AHO failed to consider Petitioner's hearsay testimony based on the 
evidence. 
Second, the Board was correct in impliedly ruling Petitioner's testimony 
regarding her husband's statements to her at the time of retirement were hearsay. 
Either these statements were to prove the truth of the matter asserted, or Petitioner 
has absolutely no evidence of any intent that Mr. Montierth wanted to select a 
different retirement option than option one. Even Petitioner's counsel at the 
hearing stated, "We will substantiate [Mr. Montierth's intent to select a different 
retirement plan] by testimony from Ms. Montierth that will show she had 
knowledge of Mr. Montierth's intention and that he, his actions were consistent 
with him choosing plan three as opposed to plan one." HT 2:22-25. In fact, this 
was Petitioner's only argument at the hearing. As a policy matter, a Petitioner 
cannot claim her evidence should be used one way at the administrative hearing, 
then claim it was being used a different way on appeal. Thus, no credible 
argument can be made that these statements were not being used to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted. 
Third, the AHO and the Board decided all relevant issues raised by 
Petitioner. Petitioner wrongly claims that the Board was required to make a 
finding of fact regarding Mr. Montierth's intent in selecting a retirement plan. 
Petitioner may only be granted relief from an appeal of a finding of fact, or lack 
thereof, if, on the basis of the factual record, the court determines that she has been 
prejudiced by Board action that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court. U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). 
The Appellate Court does not conduct a de novo credibility determination or 
reweigh the evidence. Questar Pipeline Co. v. State Tax Comm 'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 
1178 (Utah 1993). Nor will an agency's findings of fact be overturned if based on 
substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible. 
Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm >?, 767 P.2d 524, 526-27 (Utah 
1988). It is the province of the agency, not the Appellate Court, to resolve 
conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the 
same evidence, it is for the agency to draw the inference. Albertons Inc. v. 
Department of Employment Security, 854 P.2d 570, 575 (Utah App. 1993). 
Petitioner cannot meet her high burden in challenging the Board's findings of fact 
because she cannot show that "substantial evidence" in light of the entire record 
required such a separate finding. 
The Board's findings of fact regarding Petitioner's intent in selecting a 
retirement plan benefit are clear: 
4. On August 15, 2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for 
Service Retirement ("Application") with the Office for a July 16, 
2002, retirement date. 
5. On his Application, [Mr. Montierth] selected retirement, "Plan 
1 . " . . . 
11. Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony 
that Mr. Montierth mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 . . . . " 
Board's Order, HR 56 (emphasis added). 
In these findings, the Board impliedly determined: 1) the Application for 
retirement benefits shows Mr. Montierth's intent to select a plan one retirement 
benefit, and 2) Petitioner's only evidence to show a different intent was her self-
serving hearsay testimony which cannot be the sole basis for a finding of fact. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-10(3). Given these findings, the Board correctly ruled 
that no finding of fact could be made that Mr. Montierth intended to select any 
retirement plan other than plan one. 
In the alternative, even if Petitioner had proven Mr. Montierth's intent to 
select a different retirement plan at the time of his retirement, she was not 
prejudiced by the Board's decision because even a retiree cannot change his 
retirement plan selection after his retirement date. Utah Code Ann. §49-11-607(1) 
states, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by a member in the member's 
application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or cancellation of a benefit may 
be made . . . . " 17 Thus, even if Mr. Montierth had been alive to testify that he 
wanted to change his retirement plan, he could not have done so under the plain 
language of this section. As such, Petitioner was not harmed by any alleged 
failure by the Board in making, or failing to make, a finding of fact on Mr. 
Montierth's intent to select a different retirement plan. 
In sum, the AHO specifically admitted Petitioner's hearsay testimony 
regarding Petitioner's statements, made findings of fact concerning Mr. 
Montierth's intent, and correctly applied the hearsay rule. In addition, even such a 
failure by the AHO did not prejudice Petitioner because she cannot change a 
retirement plan election after the retirement date. Therefore, Petitioner's 
allegation that the Board failed to "consider" her hearsay testimony and make a 
requisite finding of fact must be denied. 
VI. MR. MONTIERTH'S SIGNED AND NOTARIZED RETIREMENT APPLICATION 
WAS VALID AND COMPLETE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 49-13-402. 
The only issue Petitioner raised before the AHO that is not precluded 
before this Court is whether Mr. Montierth's retirement application was legally 
complete. Utah Code Ann. §49-13-401 states, "A member is qualified to receive 
an allowance from this system when: . . . the member has submitted to the office a 
17
 This section is quoted in its entirety supra at 8-9. 
notarized retirement application form that states the member's proposed retirement 
date;.. ." The plain language of the statute dictates that in order to be accepted to 
effectuate benefits, a retirement application must contain: 1) a selection of a 
retirement date, and 2) a notarized signature of the member. Utah Code Ann. §49-
13-402. It is undisputed that Mr. Montierth's retirement application contained 
both a selection of a retirement date and a notarized signature of Mr. Montierth. 
Thus, Mr. Montierth's retirement application was both valid and binding.18 
Once the retirement application is complete, the retirement office cannot 
second guess an applicant's retirement choices. As the Petitioner so aptly 
explained, as a fiduciary, the retirement office maintains a duty to carry out a 
member's expressly stated intent in his/her application. This is what Retirement 
Director Judy Lund explained in her testimony when she stated, " . . . once we 
[Office] have the application and if everything's valid we presume the member has 
selected the plan he or she wishes . . . " HT 32:22-24. Indeed, one wonders how 
the retirement office could do any differently. 
Petitioner's claim of lack of a completed retirement application by Mr. 
Montierth is dubious for another reason - standing. Mr. Montierth owns any claim 
that he failed to complete the retirement application in some way. Petitioner, as an 
individual, cannot step into his shoes and challenge the validity of this 
application. Even if she was deemed the executor of his estate, which is not in the 
record, any claim must be made in the name of the estate, not Petitioner's own 
name. Thus, while a claim by Petitioner might be made as a Third Party 
beneficiary, she failed to do so both before the AHO and this Court, and cannot 
make such a claim in a Reply Brief. See, Murphy v. State Retirement Bd, 
2004 UT App. 109, (Utah Ct. App. 2004), cert denied, 94 P.3d 929 (July 19, 
2004). 
Conversely, Petitioner mistakenly complains in her argument, that because 
Mr. Montierth failed to sign the back of the retirement application, it is "null and 
void." Petitioner's Brief at 19. Once again, Petitioner provides not one scintilla of 
support for this erroneous proposition, and it is not supported by the evidence. 
Further, Petitioner incorrectly complains that this lack of signature on the back of 
the application proves Mr. Montierth failed to understand his retirement options. 
Reviewing the evidence suggests otherwise. 
First, Mr. Montierth, prior to submitting his retirement application, spoke 
with the retirement office on the telephone and received three written estimates of 
various retirement options available to him. See, HT 36:5-6, HR 50-53. After 
receipt of these estimates, Mr. Montierth then completed a purchase of future 
service credit in order to be eligible to retire attesting that he not only knew of his 
retirement options, he selected one involving additional paperwork. Second, and 
perhaps most telling of Mr. Montierth's knowledge of his retirement plans, Mr. 
Montierth specifically attested by signing his application, "I understand the 
limitations as described on the reverse side of this form." HR 47. 
Third, not once after receiving his retirement benefits did Mr. Montierth 
ever complain to anyone, not even his wife, that he had selected a retirement plan 
that did not comply with his express intent. Thus, Petitioner simply cannot 
credibly maintain that Mr. Montierth failed to understand the retirement plans 
given the evidence. 
Hence, because Mr. Montierth's signed retirement application complied 
with the plain statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402, and because 
the evidence shows Mr. Montierth understood his retirement options, Mr. 
Montierth's application was valid and binding under the plain language of the 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Board hereby asks this Court to reject Petitioner's appeal in its 
entirety. Petitioner failed to raise due process, statutory construction, and 
evidentiary issues before the AHO, thereby precluding her from raising them for 
the first time on appeal. However, if Petitioner can survive her failure to raise 
these arguments and issues, the Board granted Petitioner constitutional procedural 
due process by granting her a hearing. In the alternative, Petitioner maintains no 
individual property interest in her late husband's retirement benefit to invoke the 
due process clause. 
Additionally, the plain language of Utah Code Ann. §49-13405(2) fails to 
grant Petitioner any retirement benefit as the spouse of a retiree. Similarly, the 
AHO correctly considered Petitioner's evidence, including hearsay evidence, in 
determining under Title 49 that Petitioner failed to qualify for any continuing 
retirement benefit from her late husband's previous employment. Finally, Mr. 
Montierth's signed and notarized retirement application was valid and complete 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §49-13-402. Thus, Petitioner presented no valid 
argument vt.-v she she Mil- : •- •- •:• - .i M *<• - V H ^ iur i/oMmn 
retirement benefits must be denied. 
a& DATED this QV day of February, 2006. 
V . 
David B. Hansen 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to David L. Knowles, Attorney for 
Petitioner, 4723 Harrison, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84403 and Dennis A. Gladwell, 
Attorney for Petitioner, 1893 Wasatch Drive, Ogden, Utah 84403 on this the 
{7)0 day of February, 2006. 
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ADDENDUM "A 
BEFORE Illi: UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
KATHY MONTIERTH on Behalf of 
Wesley Montierth (Deceased), 
Petitioner, 
I I Ul SI WKRETIR] VII %l Hi* Mill 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACTS AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
l i l t / / <I.VIH»K 
Hearing Officer: Barker 
A hearing was held on August 22, 2005, before It Adjudicative Hearing Officer on 
Petitioner's Request for Board Action. Petitioner was represented by Rocky D. Crofts. The 
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") was represented by David B. Hansen. Based upon the 
evidence in this matter and the legal memoranda submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
rendered a decision in favor of the Board. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now makes the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Wesley V. Montierth ("Mr. Montierth) was a member of the Public Employees 
Noncontributory Retirement System ("PERS"). 
1 
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2. PERS is administered by the Utah State Retirement Office ("Office"). 
3. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Montierth requested and received three Retirement 
Benefit Estimates ("Estimates"). 
4. On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth filed an Application for Service Retirement 
("Application") with the Office for a July 16, 2002, retirement date. 
5. On his Application, Petitioner selected retirement "Plan 1." 
6. On August 16, 2002, Mr. Montierth had his signature on his completed 
Application notarized by Ms. Ann Hancock Young, a retirement counselor. 
7. Mr. Montierth's signed Application states in part: 
In accordance with the statutes governing the Utah ELetirement Systems, I 
make application for retirement benefits. I understand the limitations as 
described on the reverse side of this form. I hereby certify that the 
information provided on this form and any of the attached forms is true 
correct, and complete to the best of my knowledge. 
8. For 27 months, Mr. Montierth and Kathy Montierth ("Petitioner") received and 
benefited from a Plan 1 retirement benefit, which provided substantially more in 
retirement benefits than any other retirement plan benefit. 
9. Mr. Montierth passed away on October 20,2004. 
10. Petitioner is the surviving spouse of Mr. Montierth. 
11. Petitioner failed to provide any evidence outside of her testimony that Mr. 
Montierth mistakenly selected retirement Plan 1 and meant to select another 
retirement plan on his Application. 
2 
n n n n c; c 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(4) provides that Petitioner bears the burden of proof in this 
matter. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-607(1), states, "After the retirement date, which shall be set by 
a member in the member's application for retirement, no alteration, addition, or 
cancellation of a benefit may be made except as provided in Subsections (2), (3), and (4) 
or other law." 
3. Petitioner failed to provide'documentation or* testimony which A oi ild allow tier to change 
Mr. Montierth's retirement plan after his retirement date. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner's request to change Mr. Monthierth's 
retirement *; .-> • • '.-M»- Jon-a 
BOARD RECONSIDERATION 
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite foi seeking judicial 
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and 
one copy sent by mail to each person making the request. The Board chairman or executive 
director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) days of 
receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied. 
n n n n 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
If Petitioner is aggrieved with the final Board order, she may seek a judicial review 
within thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. 
Petitioner shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board actions resulting from formal proceedings. 
All petitioners shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16. 
DATED this l 3 day of August, 2005. 
</^ p&nes L. Barker, Jr. r 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer 
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Denial of the 
Adjudicative Hearing Officer is hereby adopted as the order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
Dated this £3 day of September, 2005. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
^ / John Lunt, Board President 
4 r\r\r\(\^& 
ABHR<^ iVED AS TO FORM 
ocky Crofts 
n n n n 5 q 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this the f *•/ day of-August? 2005,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the above Order, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Rocky Crofts, Esq. 
Smith Knowles 
4723 Harrison Blvd., Suite 200 
Ogden,UT 84403 
David B. Hansen 
Howard, Phillips & Andersen 
560 East 200 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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This opinion is subject to revision before final 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
00O00 
Utah Public Employees Association No. 20051121 
and Roes 1 through 5, 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
v. 
F I L E D 
State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. February 16, 2006 
Third District, Salt Lake 
The Honorable William W. Barrett 
No. 050911548 
Attorneys: Benson L. Hathaway, Alexander Dushku, 
Matthew K. Richards, Stephen W. Geary, Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiffs 
Clark Waddoups, Heidi E. Leithead, David C. Reymann, 
Cheylynn Hayman, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
Petition for Emergency Relief 
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice: 
SI In its 2005 session, the Utah Legislature passed House 
Bill 213 (H.B. 213), known as the "Unused Sick Leave at 
Retirement Amendments." Although the Legislature set the bill's 
effective date as January 1, 2006, we, at the request of 
Petitioners, postponed the effective date of the amendments to 
allow review of the constitutional issues presented in this case. 
The Utah Public Employees Association (UPEA) and Roes 1 through 5 
have asked us, on expedited review, to consider whether the 
provisions of H.B. 213 result in an unconstitutional taking of 
state employees' vested property rights. We conclude that they 
do not. 
BACKGROUND 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
f2 For more than 25 years, the State has permitted its 
agencies to adopt an incentive program intended to both reduce 
the misuse of sick leave and. to induce persons to work for the 
State in spite of generally better private-sector wages and 
benefits. This program originated in 1979 and has been subject 
to periodic legislative change since its inception. The program 
is currently titled the "Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option 
Program" (the Program), and is found in Utah Code section 67-19-
14.2. Plaintiffs contend that the 2005 amendments to the 
Program/ contained in H.B. 213, effect an unconstitutional taking 
of employees' unused sick leave benefits by retroactively 
devaluing already vested rights. The State counters that no 
rights vest until the date of actual retirement, and therefore 
the employees lack a constitutionally protected property interest 
in those unused sick leave hours. 
A. Statutory History of Utah Code section 67-19-14.2 
53 Our extensive research led to the discovery that by 
statute, the Legislature has occasionally changed the menu of 
benefits that could be acquired upon retirement in exchange for 
accrued and unused sick leave over the past 25 years, and that 
the Legislature has imposed varied restrictions on how those 
hours may be redeemed. We requested additional briefing on this 
statutory history because in their original briefs on appeal, 
both parties misstated the statutory history. 
54 The most cursory reading of the statutory history 
discloses that since 1979 the Legislature has empowered state 
agencies to permit their respective employees to participate in 
some form of unused sick leave trade-in program. At its 
inception, the program permitted employees to "at the time.of 
retirement" convert unused sick leave hours "into paid-up health 
and medical insurance."1 Under this iteration of the statute, an 
employee could convert 100% of accrued sick leave hours into 
post-retirement health and medical insurance.2 
55 Beginning in 1983, however, the Legislature changed the 
language of the statute to require employees to accept a cash 
pay-out for 25% of the accrued sick leave and medical and life 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (1979). 
2
 See id. 
No. 20051121 2 
insurance for the remaining 75%.3 This distinction between the 
sanctioned use of the 25% versus the 75% remained in effect until 
1998 when the Legislature changed the statutory scheme again to 
permit an employee to apply 25% to either a cash-payout or a 
401(k) contribution.4 Then in 2004, legislative modifications 
again allowed, but did not require, use of the entire 100% for 
medical and life insurance benefits.5 
§6 Due to the perceived desirability of the offered 
incentives, most state agencies have chosen to extend the offer 
to their employees, and many state employees have accordingly 
reserved unused sick leave for the purposes permitted by the 
Program. Participating State employees accrue sick leave hours 
at the rate of four hours per two-week pay period, and many have 
reserved, or "banked," a significant number of unused sick leave 
hours. As the Program has been administered, upon retirement, 
employees have been allowed to redeem these banked hours for 
prepaid medical and life insurance coverage or for other forms of 
cash-payouts. Generally, the Program has permitted employees to 
exchange eight unused sick leave hours for one full month's 
coverage of health insurance.6 Additional statutory provisions 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14 (1983) ("The program shall 
provide for an employee to be paid for 25% of unused accumulated 
sick leave at the employee's preretirement rate of pay . . . . 
An employee . . . whose unused sick leave, after the 25% cashout 
has been paid . . . may continue health and life insurance."). 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (1983), (1988), (1993), 
(1998), (1999). 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (2004) ("[U]pon retirement an 
employee is paid for UP to 25% of the employee's unused 
accumulated sick leave at the employee's rate of pay at the time 
of retirement." (emphasis added)). 
6
 More specifically, the Program allows each retiring 
employee to receive continuing medical and life insurance 
benefits for up to five years or until age 65, whichever occurs 
first. As briefly mentioned above, under the post-2004 version 
of the Program, upon retirement an employee may redeem unused 
sick leave hours in two ways: 
(1) An employee is paid for up to 25% of the unused accumulated 
sick leave at the employee's rate of pay at the time of 
retirement. The employee may choose to have money from this 
pay-out transferred directly to the deferred compensation 
plan qualified under section 401(k) of the Internal Revenue 
(continued...) 
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permit employees to apply the remaining unused sick leave hours 
to medical and life insurance coverage for spouses and other 
dependents once the employee reaches the age of Medicare 
eligibility.7 
57 Our own research has also led to the discovery that 
there have been widespread inconsistencies between the uses of 
unused sick leave hour redemption permitted by the statute and 
those allowed by state personnel regulations.8 In many 
instances, the regulations and practices appear to have permitted 
use of 100% of unused sick leave hours to be traded for medical 
and life insurance prior to 2004, although this practice was 
clearly unsupported by the statutory language between 1983 and 
2004. In fact, legislative debate regarding the 2004 statutory 
amendment was represented by the bill's sponsors as intended to 
bring the statute into accord with the widespread practice of 
allowing retiring employees to apply all unused sick leave toward 
paid-up medical and life insurance at the rate of eight hours to 
one month of insurance.9 
6(...continued) 
Code sponsored by the Utah State Retirement Board. 
(2) An employee may purchase additional continuing medical and 
life insurance benefits, at the rate of one month's coverage 
per policy for eight hours of unused sick leave remaining 
after: 
(a) the 25% cash out of 401(k) payout, if any; 
(b) and an additional mandatory deduction of 480 hours of 
unused sick leave. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 67-10-14.2(2) (2004). 
7
 Id^ §§ 67-19-14.2(2), 67-19-14.2(4)(a). 
8
 See, e.g., Utah Admin. Code R477-8-7(6)(c) (2000) ("An 
employee may elect to receive a cash payment or transfer . . . up 
to 25 percent of his accrued unused sick leave at his current 
rate of pay." (emphasis added)). 
9
 The bill's sponsor, Representative David Clark, introduced 
the bill by stating that "[i]n fact, the purpose of this 
legislation is to make clarifying changes only that are based on 
current agency interpretations and implementations of practice. 
There are no substantive changes that are meant or to be included 
in this draft." Audio recording: House Debate of H.B. 11, 55th 
Leg., Gen. Sess. (Feb. 10, 2004), available at 
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2004GS&Day=0&Bill=HB0 
011&House=H (emphasis added). 
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B. H.B. 213: An Amendment to the Program 
18 Beginning in 2003, the Legislature expressed increasing 
concern with escalating health insurance costs facing the State 
under the Program. In a short span of five years, the costs to 
the State for already retired employees nearly doubled. 
Moreover, the State anticipated an additional increase in the 
next ten years of more than 300%. The Legislature responded to 
these concerns by modifying the Program in 2005 with H.B. 213. 
In essence, this modification returns to the 1983-2004 statutory 
scheme, although not the actual practice, which allowed only 75% 
of the unused sick leave to be redeemed for medical and life 
insurance. Under H.B. 213, the statutory scheme again limits the 
use of the other 25%: banked sick leave falls into one of two new 
programs, depending upon when the employee banked the sick leave 
hours. 
59 "Program I" applies to all sick leave accrued prior to 
January 1, 2006, and implements a gradual, five-year phase-out of 
the guaranteed continuing medical and life insurance benefits 
(and the corresponding 480-hour automatic reduction of unused 
sick leave) that had been guaranteed under the original Program. 
Program I also eliminates the original Program's provision 
permitting employees to cash-out up to 25% of their unused sick 
leave and instead mandates that 25% be contributed to the 
employee's 401(k). Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 
the Program I modifications as substantially reducing the value 
of what they believe to be a vested right to use all 100% of 
banked sick leave in exchange for post-retirement medical and 
life insurance at the rate of eight hours of leave to one month 
of insurance coverage. 
510 "Program II'', on the other hand, applies to all unused 
sick leave hours accrued after January 1, 2006. There is no 
dispute between the parties that the State may implement program 
changes with prospective effects. We find nothing erroneous in 
that agreement, and as a result, we need not address the 
provisions of H.B. 213 that apply to Program II. 
C. The Parties 
111 Plaintiffs Roes 1 through 5 have cumulatively banked 
more than 8,000 hours of unused sick leave prior to January 1, 
2006.10 In banking this many hours of sick leave, Roe Plaintiffs 
10
 Plaintiffs' complaint asserts the following facts about 
Roes 1 through 5: 
(continued...) 
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took personal leave days rather than sick leave and often worked 
when ill. Roes 1 through 5 testified that they had been told 
that if they did not retire by December 16, 2005, they would not 
be able to utilize all of their banked sick leave hours to 
acquire medical and life insurance as they could have under the 
2004 statutory scheme. Roes 1, 2, 4, and 5 are currently 
employed with the State; Roe 3 retired on August 1, 2005. The 
parties agree that a number of state employees retired prior to 
December 16, 2005, to preserve the greater benefit allowed under 
the 2004 language of the statute. 
512 Acting in its role as the labor association 
representing the interests of current and former public employees 
on matters pertaining to public employment, UPEA commenced this 
suit along with Roes 1 through 5. The record reflects the 
extensive communication between UPEA and its members after the 
10
 (. . . continued) 
(1) Roe 1 is 62 years old and has worked for the State for over 
30 years. He has accumulated over 1,800 hours of unused sick 
leave and had planned to retire in 2006, but due to the changes 
implemented with H.B. 213, he plans to retire before the bill 
becomes effective. If he retires after the bill becomes 
effective, he loses nearly 5 years of health insurance coverage 
which would have been covered by his accrued unused sick leave. 
(2) Roe 2 is 58 years old and has worked for the State for over 
30 years. He plans on retiring upon turning 60 in 2007. Under 
the Program, his accumulated unused sick leave provides him with 
medical insurance until reaching 80 years and 10 months old. 
Under H.B. 213, however, his accrued unused hours will provide 
him with health insurance benefits only until he is 75 years and 
7 months old, a difference of over 5 years of coverage. 
(3) Roe 3 is 45 years old and has worked for the State for over 
20 years. He has accumulated over 2,100 hours of unused sick 
leave. The effectiveness of H.B. 213 decreases the value of his 
unused sick leave coverage by 5 ^ years. 
(4) Roe 4 is 51 years old and has worked for the State for over 
20 years. Post-H.B. 213, Roe 4 loses 6 years of medical 
coverage. 
(5) Roe 5 is 40 years old and has worked for the State for 14 
years. She has accumulated over 700 hours of unused sick leave 
and has recently declined numerous employment offers from private 
employers, specifically relying on the State's health insurance 
benefits from the pre-H.B. 213 Program. 
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proposal of H.B. 213 and demonstrates that UPEA adequately 
represents the interests of its members in this case. 
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
513 Plaintiffs UPEA and Roes 1 through 5 filed their 
complaint on June 29, 2005, in the district court and 
subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction to stay the 
effective date of H.B. 213 pending resolution of their 
constitutional challenge. The State opposed the injunction and 
moved for a dismissal based on the allegations of the pleadings. 
After briefing, the district court held evidentiary hearings on 
November 7, 9, 16, and 18, 2005. On December 8, 2005, the 
district court denied Plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary 
injunction and granted the State's motion for a judgment in its 
favor on the pleadings. 
514 Plaintiffs petitioned this court on December 13, 2005, 
for an emergency stay on the effective date of the statutory 
changes to allow an appeal of the district court's decision. 
Absent such an emergency stay, the window of opportunity for 
employees otherwise in a position to realize the greater benefit 
of exchanging 100% rather than 75% of their unused sick leave for 
paid insurance upon retirement would have expired within three 
days of the matter reaching us. We granted the emergency stay on 
December 14, 2005, and enjoined, for at least until thirty days 
after the final disposition of this appeal, the implementation of 
H.B. 213's provisions insofar as they amend Utah Code section 67-
19-14.2. The State filed a motion to vacate the order granting 
emergency relief and requested oral arguments on the matter, 
which we heard on December 15, 2005. The State argued that the 
petition did not meet the necessary standards we impose for such 
relief, but ultimately agreed to the ongoing injunction with the 
request that the court act with all possible haste so that the 
impending legislative session might deal with any necessary 
revisions of the scheme. We denied the State's motion to vacate 
the order granting emergency relief, and to facilitate expedited 
review of the matter on its merits, ordered Plaintiffs to perfect 
their appeal on or before December 29, 2005, ordered expedited 
briefing by the parties, and set oral argument on the merits for 
January 10, 2006. 
5115 Given the extremely short time allotted to each party 
to present its arguments in the briefs, the submissions were 
adequate. However, after oral argument, it became obvious to the 
court that important and influential matters had not been 
included in any briefing or argument by either party. 
Consequently, on January 23, 2006, we requested additional 
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briefing. The parties had failed to address the complex history 
of the statutory scheme and its relevance to the constitutional 
challenge presented. Moreover, the parties insisted on staking 
out diametrically opposing positions, apparently without any 
thought of assisting the court in finding a principled, legally 
correct solution to the problem created by the obtuse language 
employed in the statute and the actual practice engaged in by the 
State over decades. Unfortunately, although the court requested 
the parties to address those questions that most concerned it, 
the parties chose in their supplemental briefs to either discount 
the importance of the issues raised by the court or failed to 
shed any meaningful light on the questions. 
516 Ordinarily, in matters presented to the court, the 
parties and the court have the benefit of thoughtful and thorough 
analysis by both the parties and the lower court to expose and 
resolve questions. In the case of an expedited review of this 
sort, where the district court's order had not even been reduced 
to writing at the time the petition was presented to us for 
action, and the time for preparation of the briefs, record, and 
other supplemental materials necessary for our review has been 
shortened to the point of practical elimination, the usual help 
given to the court by the parties has been diminished. 
517 Nevertheless, it is the obligation of the court to 
reach a conclusion on the questions presented. To not answer, or 
to refuse to answer under such pressure of time, and with 
inadequate help from the parties, is not an option. However, 
since there is no other authority available to review and correct 
our errors in judgment on the legal merits of the case presented 
should we wrongly decide the question of constitutionality of the 
statute, we are also required to do all that we can to discover, 
consider, and incorporate those legal and statutory elements that 
are critical to a correct decision. This we have labored to do. 
118 It is also important to note that in a republican form 
of government, and as specified in our state constitution, the 
judicial power of the State is vested in this court. Moreover, 
judges must exercise that power only in accord with the law and 
the facts of the case, without regard to pressures brought by the 
other branches of government or special interests of any kind. 
This, too, we have labored to do. If media reports are accurate 
of threats by members of the Legislature to withhold salary 
increases for all state employees generally, and judicial 
salaries in particular, in an effort to force this court to act 
more quickly or to reach a certain result, then those making such 
threats fail to grasp the very core of the separation of powers 
doctrine and the value to the people of our state of a truly 
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independent and responsible judiciary. Further, the suggestion 
in the briefing of the State that a decision unfavorable to the 
State's position might result in a negative impact on judicial 
retirement benefits, among others, might also be perceived as an 
unwise effort to appeal to personal interests, an effort that we 
reject as disrespectful of our function and therefore of the 
constitutional responsibilities of the judicial branch itself. 
ANALYSIS 
I. PLAINTIFFS MAY ASSERT A FACIAL CHALLENGE TO H.B. 213 
519 When challenging the constitutionality of a statute, 
Plaintiffs carry the burden of establishing that the statute is 
"unconstitutional either on its face or as applied to the facts 
of the given case."11 In this instance, because the statutory 
changes set forth in H.B. 213 are not yet effective, the parties 
may assert only a facial challenge. They concede that an as 
applied challenge would be improper. 
520 The State contests the availability to Plaintiffs of a 
facial challenge, relying on United States v.. Salerno, a case in 
which the United States Supreme Court required the challenger to 
establish that "no set of circumstances exists under which the 
[challenged] Act would be valid" in order to succeed.12 However, 
in its reliance on Salerno, the State fails to acknowledge that 
both the United States Supreme Court and this court have 
discredited, at least to some extent, the application of the 
Salerno standard. The facts of this case present circumstances 
where Salerno is not the correct standard and need not be 
followed. 
221 When state courts interpret their own state law, the 
United States Supreme Court has not required adherence to 
Salerno. The plurality opinion in City of Chicago v. Morales 
clarified that the "assumption that state courts must apply the 
restrictive Salerno test is incorrect as a matter of law; 
moreover it contradicts ^essential principles of federalism.'"13 
11
 State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, 1 4 n.2, 993 P.2d 854; see 
also Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (explaining that plaintiffs carry a "heavy burden" in 
facial challenges). 
12
 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) . 
13
 527 U.S. 41, 55 n.22 (1999) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, 
(continued...) 
9 No. 20051121 
We agree. The Court explained that because state courts are not 
bound by federal law when assessing the constitutionality of 
state law under state constitutions, they need not follow the 
narrow interpretation of facial challenges found in Salerno.14 
222 The Morales Court also suggested, by referencing 
scholarly articles on the matter, that in state law cases in 
state courts, a more appropriate threshold for determining the 
validity of facial challenges may simply exist in establishing 
the substantive merits of the case—the unconstitutionality of 
the legislation.15 
523 More importantly in this situation, we have rejected 
the Salerno standard in some instances and have discredited its 
universal application. For instance, in State v. Gardner, an 
Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause case, we 
determined that the "[s]tate's reliance on the due process 
standard—*no set of circumstances exists under which the act 
would be valid' [from Salerno1 — [was] . . . misplaced."16 We 
relied rather on the broader Supreme Court standard for cruel and 
unusual punishment cases found in Gregg v. Georgia.17 
524 We have also declined to apply Salerno in takings 
cases. In Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, for example, 
our court of appeals turned to the substantive law in determining 
13
 ( . . . continued) 
Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 4 6 Stan. L. Rev. 
235, 284 (1994) ) . 
14
 See id. ("Whether or not it would be appropriate for 
federal courts to apply the Salerno standard in some cases—a 
proposition which is doubtful—state courts need not apply 
prudential notions of standing created by this Court."). 
15
 See id.; see, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to 
State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 235 (1994). 
16
 947 P.2d 630, 645 (Utah 1997) ("[A] facial challenge to a 
statute under the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment 
provision requires a different standard than that applicable 
under the due process clause at issue in Salerno.") . 
17
 Id. (rejecting Salerno to follow Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 175 (1976)). 
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whether a facial challenge was proper.18 In other words, the 
court looked specifically to the constitutionality of the 
legislation affecting the challenger's property.19 The court 
held that if plaintiffs do not allege "any injury due to the 
enforcement of the statute, there is as yet no concrete 
controversy regarding the application of the specific provisions 
and regulations. Thus, the only question before this court is 
whether the mere enactment of the statutes and regulations 
constitutes a taking."20 This is an approach we endorse. Many 
other courts in the United States have likewise relied on the 
substantive merits of the takings claim in determining the 
validity of a facial challenge.21 
525 Plaintiffs' facial challenge is validly brought under 
both United States Supreme Court jurisprudence and our own case 
law. As articulated by the Supreme Court in Morales, an 
essential principle of federalism is that states have the 
18
 958 P.2d 245, 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (relying on 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987)). 
19
 liL. 
20
 Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 493. 
21
 See, e.g., NJD, Ltd. v. City of San Dimas, 110 Cal. App. 
4th, 1428, 1438-39 (2003) (describing the test for a valid facial 
challenge as "straightforward" and based on the substantive law: 
"whether the mere enactment of the legislation constitutes a 
taking"); Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship v. County of Alameda, 110 Cal. 
App. 4th 1246, 1266-67 (2003) ("A facial challenge questions only 
^whether the mere enactment of the land use regulation 
constitutes a taking. The test to be applied in considering a 
facial challenge is straightforward."); Glisson v. Alachua 
County, 558 So. 2d 1030, 1036 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (noting 
that when a taking claim arises in the context of a "facial 
challenge rather than in the context of a concrete controversy 
. . . , the only issue is whether the mere enactment of the 
regulation constitutes a taking. The test to be applied in 
considering a facial challenge is relatively straightforward, 
i.e., x[a] statute regulating the uses that can be made of 
property effects a taking'"). 
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authority to create their own constitutional law when reviewing 
claims brought under their own state constitution,, Here, 
Plaintiffs have filed their takings claim under the Utah 
Constitution in Utah state court. Consequently, we are not 
required to follow Salerno's "restrictive" test for facial 
challenges, and we elect not to in this instance. Rather, we 
conclude that because Plaintiffs UPEA and Roes 1 through 5 have 
undisputed standing, the ultimate test for the propriety of 
bringing a facial challenge lies in the substantive merits of the 
claim. Thus, our analysis turns on the question of whether H.B. 
213 constitutes an unconstitutional taking as alleged. 
II. THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF H.B. 213 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TAKING 
S[26 The thrust of Plaintiffs' claim is that the imposition 
of the retroactive provisions of H.B. 213 constitutes an 
unconstitutional taking of their vested property interest in the 
banked unused sick leave. Article I, section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution provides that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken 
or damaged for public use without just compensation." We have 
previously defined what constitutes a taking under this 
constitutional provision: "A ^taking' is *any substantial 
interference with private property which destroys or materially 
lessens its value, or by which the owner's right to its use and 
enjoyment is in any substantial degree abridged or destroyed.'"22 
Thus, to establish that H.B. 213 results in an impermissible 
taking, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have a protectable 
property interest in redeeming the banked sick leave hours for 
medical and life insurance and that provisions of H.B. 213 would 
result in the government's taking of that property. 
A. Plaintiffs Do Not Have a Property Interest in the Specific Use 
of Their Unused Sick Leave 
5[27 "A claimant must possess some protectable interest in 
property before [being] entitled to recover[y] under this 
[takings] provision."23 In this case, Plaintiffs argue that 
exchanging their banked and unused sick leave hours for medical 
and life insurance at the rate authorized by the 2(304 version of 
the statute is vested personal property to which they have a 
22
 Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 
1990) (quoting State ex rel. State Rd. Comm'n v. Dist. Court, 
Fourth Judicial Dist., 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1937)). 
23
 IcL at 625; see also Smith v. Price Dev. Co,, 2005 UT 87, 
I 12, 125 P.3d 945. 
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contractual right. As a general rule, public employment is 
governed by statute and legislative policy, and is therefore 
subject to change as thought best by the people, acting through 
their legislative representatives.24 Nevertheless, the 
modification of the terms of public employment are subject to two 
common sense exceptions to the general rule: first, when a public 
employee has a vested contractual interest in retirement 
benefits;25 or second, when the government entity has entered • 
into an express or implied contract by voluntarily undertaking 
additional obligations beyond the relevant statutory 
requirements.26 Plaintiffs argue that they have valid 
contractual rights under both exceptions. We disagree. 
1. Plaintiffs lack vested contract rights. 
528 Plaintiffs assert their interests under the first 
exception, claiming that a public employee has a vested 
contractual interest in exchanging 100% of the unused sick leave 
hours for medical and life insurance at retirement. We disagree. 
529 Both parties argue that a public employee obtains 
vested rights to retirement benefits "only when he has satisfied 
all conditions precedent."27 We agree that parties must satisfy 
all conditions precedent before the rights vest. The pivotal 
question is at what point state employees satisfy the requisite 
conditions precedent to vest a protectable property interest in 
using 100% of their unused sick leave hours for medical and life 
insurance. 
530 As always, we first look to the plain language of the 
statute to determine the conditions precedent. Based on the 
24
 Cf. Canfield v. Lavton City, 2005 UT 60, 1 16, 122 P.3d 
622; Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 5 32, 99 P.2d 842; Knight v. 
Salt Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, 5 8, 46 P.3d 247; Hom v. Utah 
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 101.(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
25
 See, e.g., Hansen v. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 246 P.2d 
591 (Utah 1952); Newcomb v. Qgden City Pub. Sch. Teachers' Ret. 
Comm'n, 243 P.2d 941 (Utah 1952); Driggs v. Utah Teachers Ret. 
Bd., 142 P.2d 657 (Utah 1943). 
26
 See. Canfield, 2005 UT 60, 5 16; Buckner, 2005 UT 78, 
1 32. 
27
 Horn, 962 P.2d at 100. 
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statute and the accompanying regulations,28 the State contends 
that the statutory scheme unambiguously dictates that an employee 
may not receive retirement benefits until that employee actually 
retires. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, interpret the statutory 
language to mean that any member who chooses to bank unused sick 
leave has a vested property interest to use that sick leave for 
medical and life insurance benefits at retirement. We disagree 
with both parties' statutory interpretations. 
$31 Instead, we find the statutory language ambiguous as to 
when an employee's right to redeem the unused sick leave for 
medical and life insurance vests. Section 67-19-14.2 states that 
"[a]n agency may offer the []Program to an employee who is 
eligible to receive retirement benefits in accordance with Title 
49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act."29 One 
might expect Title 4 9 to provide direction on the conditions 
precedent necessary for an employee to be "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits." 
132 Title 49, however, fails to clarify when an employee is 
"eligible to receive retirement benefits." The Title, with its 
eight parts and forty-four statutory sections, speaks of "service 
credits," "benefits," and "allowances" but fails to explain the 
distinctions, including when an employee is eligible for each. 
The State argues that retirement benefits are synonymous with 
"allowances." Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that if an 
employees is earning service credits, an employee is eligible for 
retirement benefits but not for allowances. Our research 
indicates that neither retirement benefits nor allowances are 
used to define or explain one another, and that employees are 
generally eligible for service credits upon the effective date of 
employment.30 
533 Absent clear language regarding or an obvious 
interpretation of "eligible to receive retirement benefits" in 
section 67-19-49 and Title 49, we conclude that the statutory 
language is ambiguous. It is clearly capable of more than one 
28
 For example, R477-7-6 of the Human Resource Management 
Regulations Governing Sick Leave and Sick Leave Retirement 
Benefits found in the Utah Administrative Code states that 
"[u]pon retirement from active employment, an employee may be 
offered a retirement benefit program, according to Section 67-19-
14(2) ." 
29
 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(b) (emphasis added). 
30
 S.ee Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-201(1), -401. 
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logical meaning within the statutory scheme. For example, a 
state employee might be "eligible to receive retirement benefits" 
when she reaches the length of service required for retirement 
and the age required for retirement, and submits her signed 
notice of retirement to the appropriate office or official of 
state government. Alternatively, one might be "eligible to 
receive retirement benefits" when reaching the service and age 
minimums, even if he continues to work. Additionally, one might 
be considered "eligible to receive retirement benefits" when one 
is employed in a full-time position by the State, in an agency or 
position for which there exists a retirement program under the 
extensive provisions of Title 49. While one or more of these 
possibilities may seem more logical, useful, or fair than 
another, such is not the question we face. Unable to accurately 
discern from the naked language alone which of the possible 
meanings is the meaning intended by the legislative drafters, we 
have no choice but to examine other appropriate evidence of what 
meaning is correct. 
134 Moreover, the plausible interpretations of the isolated 
word "eligible" in both section 67-19-14.2 and Title 49 also 
render the statutory language ambiguous. The State suggests that 
one is "eligible" when one is "qualified" to receive an 
allowance.31 UPEA, on the other hand, argues that because Title 
49 never refers to "eligibility" in relation to allowance but 
rather only in respect to service credits, "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" cannot be synonymous with "qualified to 
receive an allowance." 
135 Furthermore, our prior case law suggests that "eligible 
to receive retirement benefits" is an ambiguous phrase. In 
Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement System Board of 
Administration, for instance, we struggled with how to define 
eligibility for retirement benefits.32 We held there that an 
employee "who has neither served the necessary years to qualify 
for pension, nor attained the retirement age [ ] has no vested 
rights in the pension or retirement system"33 and that since the 
plaintiff had "neither served the time requisite to entitle him 
to retire and receive a pension, nor had he attained retirement 
age," he had no vested rights in a pension or the retirement 
31
 See Utah Code Ann. §§ 49-12-401(1), -402; 49-13-401(1), 
-402. 
32
 246 P.2d 591, 596 (1952) . 
33
 IdL 
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system.34 This interpretation adds to the ambiguity because it 
implies that an employee may be eligible to receive retirement 
benefits upon attaining retirement age, serving a requisite 
number of years, qualifying for retirement benefits, or some 
combination thereof. 
536 Consequently, we conclude that section 67-19-14.2 lacks 
a clear meaning for "eligible to receive retirement benefits" 
because the language gives rise to several plausible 
interpretations. As noted, it may refer to the time at which the 
employee walks out of the building for the last time and actually 
retires, or perhaps to the point when, after having worked for 
the State the requisite number of years to receive contributions 
to the Utah Retirement System, the employee chooses yet to 
continue state employment. It may also mean the condition 
described under Utah Code sections 49.12.201, 49.13.201, 
49.14.201 and any of the other general membership requirements to 
the sixteen retirement acts listed under Title 49.35 Each of 
those sections applies to any full-time employee whose employer 
chose to participate in the described program and who is earning 
service credits. Both the statutory language and Utah case law 
are ambiguous as to whether employees' property rights vest at 
eligibility for retirement, actual retirement, or eligibility for 
the payout. 
537 We accordingly turn to the available indications of 
legislative intent to determine at what point all conditions 
precedent are satisfied for the vesting of employees' right to 
redeem unused sick leave for medical and life insurance under the 
Program.36 The legislative intent behind these particular 
retirement benefits is clearly stated as "inducements to work for 
the state"37 and "to reduce sick leave abuse."38 Logically, no 
Id. at 596-97. 
35
 Utah Code Ann. §§ 49.12.201, 49.13.201, 49.14.201 (2004). 
36
 See Murohv v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) ("[W]here there is an ambiguity or uncertainty in a portion 
of a statute . . . and if it is reasonably susceptible of 
different interpretations, the one should be chosen which best 
harmonizes with its [the statute's] general purpose."). 
37
 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-3(16) (2005) ("*Total 
compensation' means salaries and wages, bonuses, paid leave, 
group insurance plans, retirement, and all other benefits offered 
to state employees as inducements to work for the state." 
(continued...) 
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incentive exists if, as the State urges, the agency may offer the 
benefit only on the occasion of the employee leaving his or her 
state job by retirement. A benefit not known until the very day 
on which the employee can do nothing to earn it, is no incentive 
at all. 
538 In fact, the undisputed evidence before the district 
court was that state agencies routinely described the 
availability of the sick leave conversion to prepaid medical and 
life insurance at retirement to their employees for the very 
purpose described in the statute: to encourage state employees to 
remain state employed in the face of lower wages than available 
elsewhere, and to encourage limited use of sick leave. 
539 Thus, we conclude that state agencies inviting 
employees to participate in the Program during the course of 
their state employment constituted an offer by the State. 
140 We also conclude, however, that the State's offer was 
to exchange the unused sick leave for a benefit upon retirement, 
but not necessarily any particular benefit. The various changes 
in the statutory scheme from 1979 to 2004 clearly demonstrate 
that the Legislature intended to reserve the ability 'to modify 
the menu of available benefits, and did not intend to bind the 
State forever to redeem 100% of the unused sick leave hours for 
any one use, and in particular not necessarily for medical and 
life insurance. 
541 The critical issue is at what point employees can act 
to accept the offer to redeem banked sick leave exclusively for 
medical and life insurance. This is an important question 
because employees' property interest to use these accrued hours 
for medical and life insurance vests only after an acceptance of 
the State's offer to redeem them in such a way. 
542 In our review of the statutory language and relevant 
legislative history, we are compelled to conclude that the State 
intended employees to accept the offer to redeem the hours for 
unused sick leave only upon retirement. For example, the 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the statute provide that 
"[u]pon retirement from active employment, an employee may be 
37
 (. . . continued) 
(emphasis added)). 
38
 l£L § 67-19-14 (1979); id^'§ 67-19-14 (1983); id^ § 67-
19-14(1) (1988); id^ § 67-19-14(1) (1993); id^ § 67-19-14(1) 
(1998); id^ § 67-19-14(1) (1999). 
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offered a retirement benefit program, according to Section 67-19-
14.2."39 We can only interpret this to mean that at the time of 
retirement an employee is offered a choice of the manner in which 
the hours may be exchanged for other benefits of value. Those 
choices can only be from those delineated in the then-current 
statutory version of the Program. Only at that point may the 
employee accept that particular offer to redeem the hours in the 
manner set forth in the current statute. Moreover, as a matter 
of ordinary contract law, until accepted, the State's offer is 
subject to unilateral modification. Thus, a property interest in 
accumulated sick leave hours for the specific purpose of 
exchanging them for paid medical and life insurance cannot vest, 
as a matter of law, until the employee retires. The result is 
that the first exception to the general rule is of no consequence 
in our analysis of Plaintiffs' claims. 
2. The State undertook a voluntary obligation. 
143 Nevertheless, a contract in a public employment setting 
may also arise if the State "voluntarily undertake[s] an 
additional duty that it would otherwise have no obligation to 
perform,/'40 Plaintiffs argue that their contractual rights exist 
because State agencies did exactly that in offering the Program 
to their employees. 
544 The State, on the other hand, argues that in permitting 
agencies to choose whether to offer employees the benefits of the 
Program, those agencies failed to undertake an additional 
obligation beyond statutory terms,41 since the statutory scheme 
authorized the offer. The State misinterprets prior Utah cases 
on the issue. The cases to which the State cites, namely, 
Buckner v. Kennard,42 Knight v. Salt Lake County,43 and Horn v. 
Utah Department of Public Safety,44 deal specifically with 
changes to prospective compensation, hiring procedures, or other 
employment structures controlled only by statute and which the 
State required the involved agencies to adopt. The statutory 
39
 Utah Admin. Code R477-7-6 (2005). 
40
 Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, 1 34, 99 P.3d 842. 
41
 See id. 
42
 2004 UT 78. 
43
 2002 UT App 1 0 0 , 46 P . 3 d 2 4 7 . 
44
 962 P . 2 d 95 (Utah C t . App . 1 9 9 8 ) . 
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terms at issue in those instances were not regarding additional 
duties that the agencies "would otherwise have no obligation to 
perform. "45 
545 With the Program at issue in this case, however, state 
agencies had no obligation to offer the incentives found in Utah 
Code section 67-19-14.2 to their employees. Instead, the 
Legislature specifically constructed the statute to state that 
M[a]n agency may offer the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option 
Program" to its employees.46 Therefore, in choosing to offer the 
Program, state agencies volunteered to undertake the additional 
duty of providing enhanced retirement benefits in exchange for 
the employee taking fewer sick days and for staying with the 
State until retirement. This constituted a valid offer to redeem 
unused sick leave hours upon retirement. 
54 6 Nevertheless, the critical question remains at what 
point in time employees are able to accept the offer. As 
described above, employees may not accept this offer until 
retirement. The State's offer of various pay-out options, 
specifically, the 401(k), cash-out, or medical and life insurance 
coverage, can only be accepted when employees retire. At that 
point, an employee chooses how to redeem accumulated unused sick 
leave from the options then available, and the State is bound. 
Until that time, however, the State retains the ability to modify 
terms of the offer as needed or prudent.47 
547 Therefore, although the State voluntarily undertook an 
obligation to employees who bank unused sick leave to allow those 
employees to eventually redeem unused sick leave hours for value, 
the State's offer does not lock in the method of pay-out until 
retirement. Consequently, it cannot be said that the State 
voluntarily undertook an obligation to permit employees to redeem 
100% of their unused sick leave hours for medical and life 
insurance. Absent this specific voluntary obligation by the 
State, employees have no protectable property interest in 
redeeming all or any of those hours for medical and life 
insurance until they reach actual retirement and make the 
appropriate election from among the then-available options. 
45
 Buckner, 2004 UT 78, 1 34. 
46
 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) . 
47
 See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (the title to the section 
includes "Payout at Retirement"). 
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B. We Need Not Address Whether H.B. 213 Materially Lessens the 
Value of Plaintiffs' Property Interest 
548 Because the ability to redeem 100% of the banked unused 
sick leave hours for a particular purpose does not vest until the 
employee makes a choice at the time of retirement, the option of 
using them all for paid insurance is not personal property and 
cannot be taken by the State. Consequently, we need not consider 
the second prong of the takings analysis, namely, whether H.B. 
213 substantially interfered with the unused sick leave hours in 
a manner that destroyed or materially lessened their value or 
abridged or destroyed employees' use or enjoyment of them in any 
substantial degree.48 Because Plaintiffs lack a constitutionally 
protected property interest in redeeming 100% of their unused 
sick leave hours for medical and life insurance, their takings 
claim fails. 
CONCLUSION 
14 9 Plaintiffs UPEA and Roes 1 through 5 have properly 
raised a facial challenge to H.B. 213. Their facial challenge 
fails on the merits because implementation of H.B. 213 does not 
result in an unconstitutional taking under the Utah Constitution. 
Plaintiffs have no present property interest in redeeming their 
unused sick leave hours for medical and life insurance because 
(1) although the State voluntarily offered to undertake a 
contractual duty with them, State employees cannot accept the 
offer specifying the form of redemption until retirement, and (2) 
Plaintiffs contractual rights cannot vest until that offer has 
been accepted. Further fact finding regarding a vital state 
interest and a substantial substitute are unnecessary because 
Plaintiffs lack a constitutionally protected property interest. 
Thus, we conclude that H.B. 213 does not effect a taking of 
property and is therefore constitutional under article I, section 
22 of the Utah Constitution. 
550 The decision of the trial court is affirmed. The stay 
and injunction imposed by this court is vacated, effective 30 
days frcm the date of this opinion. Further relief is denied. 
48
 See Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 625 
(Utah 1990). 
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551 Chief Justice Durham and Judge Greenwood concur in 
Associate Chief Justice Wilkins' opinion. 
552 Having disqualified himself, Justice Durrant does not 
participate herein; Utah Court of Appeals Judge Pamela T. 
Greenwood sat. 
PARRISH, Justice, concurring: 
553 I agree with the lead opinion's conclusion that H.B. 
213 does not effect an unconstitutional taking of plaintiffs' 
property. I write separately to express my opinion that state 
employees had no vested right to exchange their accrued sick 
leave for health insurance because the plain language of the 2004 
version of the Unused Sick Leave Retirement Option Program 
("Option Program"), Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2, limited 
participation in the program to those employees eligible to 
receive retirement benefits. Accordingly, state agencies could 
offer the program only to those employees who had elected to 
retire. Further, were I to assume the existence of a statutory 
ambiguity with regard to the vesting issue, I would conclude that 
extrinsic evidence of legislative intent and relevant principles 
of statutory construction dictate the same result. 
554 Plaintiffs raise only one claim on appeal, a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of H.B. 213. Resolution of 
their facial challenge hinges on whether they can establish that 
they had a vested right to exchange 100% of their accrued sick 
leave for insurance. If so, H.B. 213 effects an unconstitutional 
taking of their property. If not, their challenge fails. 
155 As the lead opinion correctly states, because the terms 
of public employment are generally governed by statute and 
legislative policy, they are subject to legislative change. We 
have recognized only two exceptions pursuant to which a public 
employee may acquire a contractual interest in employment 
benefits. The first is when a governmental employer has entered 
into an express or implied contract by voluntarily undertaking 
obligations beyond those provided by statute. See Canfield v. 
Lavton City, 2005 UT 60, I 16, 122 P.3d 622. The second is when 
an employee acquires a vested contractual interest pursuant to 
the terms of the operative statute. See Hansen v. Pub. Employees 
Ret. Svs., 246 P.2d 591, 595-96 (Utah 1952). I will address each 
exception in turn. 
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I. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT ESTABLISH ANY PROPERTY INTEREST 
PURSUANT TO THE VOLUNTARY UNDERTAKING EXCEPTION 
556 To give rise to a protectable property interest under 
the voluntary undertaking exception, the voluntary undertaking 
must stem from an agreement that alters or adds to the statutory 
terms and conditions of public employment. See Buckner v. 
Kennard, 2004 UT 78, SI 34, 99 P. 3d 842. This exception appears 
inapplicable in a case such as this where plaintiffs have raised 
only a facial challenge to the governing statute. 
157 As the trial court found, the plaintiffs in this case 
rested their claims entirely on the statutory language. 
Plaintiffs presented no evidence and the trial court made no 
finding of any obligation or undertaking by state agencies apart 
from the decision of the agencies to participate in the Option 
Program as set forth in the governing statute. While agency 
participation in the Option Program was voluntary, the terms of 
that participation were indisputably statutory. Etecause 
plaintiffs lodge only a facial challenge to H.B. 213, their 
voluntary undertaking argument is entirely dependent upon the 
statutory language, which, as discussed below, dictates that any 
offer of program benefits may occur only upon retirement. 
II. THE PLAIN STATUTORY LANGUAGE DOES NOT CREATE ANY 
VESTED RIGHTS IN STATE EMPLOYEES UNTIL THEY ELECT TO RETIRE 
558 I believe that the statutory language is determinative 
in resolving plaintiffs' claim that they had a vested right to 
exchange 100% of their unused sick leave for health insurance. 
In prior cases involving the claims of public employees, we have 
reasoned that the nature of the rights at issue "rest largely 
upon the language of the particular statute" involved. Driggs v. 
Utah Teachers Ret. Bd., 142 P.2d 657, 663 (Utah 1943); see also 
Newcomb v. Ogden City Pub. Sch. Teachers' Ret. Comm'n, 243 P.2d 
941, 944 (Utah 1952) ("[T]he rights of pensioners must be 
determined by the purpose and language of the retirement act."). 
559 When construing statutory language, this court adheres 
to the well-accepted rule that we do "*not look beyond the plain 
language of [the] provision unless we find some ambiguity in 
it.'" State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68, I 7, 31 P.3d 528 (alteration 
in original) (quoting In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 866 (Utah 
1996)); Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, 1 8, 70 P.3d 85. Only 
upon finding ambiguity may we "seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy considerations." Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 
f 1 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, we may 
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not resort to extrinsic aids of interpretation unless we first 
find ambiguity in the statutory text. See id. 
160 Like a contract, a statute is ambiguous when it may 
reasonably Mbe understood to have two or more plausible 
meanings.,/ Alf v. State Farm Fire & Gas. Co., 850 P. 2d 1272, 
1274 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (defining 
ambiguity in the context of a contract); Saleh v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 2006 UT 1, 1 15, P.3d . But determining whether 
there are two or more plausible meanings depends not only on the 
text of the particular provision at issue, but also on the text 
of the statute as a whole. See Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of 
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 591 (Utah 1991). 
Indeed, M[w]e xread the plain language of the statute as a whole, 
and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in 
the same chapter and related chapters.'" State v. Barrett, 2005 
UT 88, 5 29, P.3d (quoting Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 
I 17, 66 P.3d 592). As a result, a statute susceptible to 
competing interpretations may nevertheless be unambiguous if the 
text of the act as a whole, in light of related statutory 
provisions, makes all but one of those meanings implausible. Id. 
When viewing the act as a whole does not eliminate duplicative 
yet plausible meanings, the statute is ambiguous, and we may 
resort to extrinsic interpretive tools to resolve the ambiguity. 
See Ostler, 2001 UT 68, 1 7. 
561 As the lead opinion ably explains, the statutory 
iterations of the Option Program from 1983 through 2004 all 
required that employees convert at least 25% of their accrued 
sick leave to cash or a 401(k) contribution. In all respects 
material to this appeal, these prior iterations are therefore 
indistinguishable from H.B. 213. As a result, only the 2004 
iteration of the Program could have conceivably vested in state 
employees the right to convert to health insurance the first 25% 
of their accrued sick leave. I therefore confine my analysis to 
the 2004 statute. 
162 The 2004 statute provides that "[a]n agency may offer 
the [Option Program] to an employee who is eligible to receive 
retirement benefits in accordance with Title 49, Utah State 
Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) (2004). The lead opinion concludes that this 
language is ambiguous because it could be construed to apply to 
(1) all regular, full-time state employees; (2) all state 
employees who have reached the requisite age and years of 
employment necessary to retire under a particular retirement 
system; or (3) retiring employees. I disagree and conclude that 
the statutory language effectively precludes agencies from even 
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offering the Option Program until an employee has elected to 
retire. 
563 My analysis necessarily starts with "the usual and 
natural meaning" of the operative terms of the statute. See 
Saleh, 2006 UT 1, 5 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"Offer" is a verb meaning "an instance of presenting something 
for acceptance." Black's Law Dictionary 1113 (8th ed. 2004). 
"Eligible" is an adjective referring to one who is "legally 
qualified for a[] . . . privilege, or status," or "[f]it and 
proper to . . . receive a benefit." Id. at 559. "Receive" is a 
verb meaning "to come into possession of." Merriam-Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary 975 (10th ed. 1998). And because the 
statute is phrased in the present tense, it allows an agency to 
offer the "Program to an employee who JLS. eligible to receive 
retirement benefits," not to an employee who may become or who 
could be eligible to receive benefits some time in the future. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) (emphasis added). Moreover, 
subsection (2) of the statute specifically states that an 
employee may purchase continuing medical and life insurance 
benefits "upon retirement." Id. § 67-19-14.2(2). 
564 The commonly understood definitions of these operative 
terms dictate that state agencies could present the Option 
Program for acceptance only to those employees who were 
currently, legally qualified to come into possession of 
retirement benefits. This renders implausible the interpretation 
urged by plaintiffs, that the language allowed state agencies to 
offer the Option Program to all regular, full-time employees. It 
also undercuts the suggestion that the statute could plausibly be 
interpreted to allow agencies to offer the Option Program to 
employees with the requisite age and years of service necessary 
to enable them to retire but who have not elected to do so. 
Indeed, it is implausible to suggest that an employee who has not 
yet elected to retire could be eligible to receive (as opposed to 
be eligible to apply for) benefits. I therefore conclude that 
the text of section 67-19-14.2 prevents an agency from offering 
the Option Program until an employee elects to retire. 
565 The majority rejects this interpretation as implausible 
because it believes such an interpretation is inconsistent with 
the stated legislative purpose of the program, which is to induce 
employees to reduce sick leave abuse. I find no such 
inconsistency. The fact that the program did not vest employees 
with the contractual right to exchange 100% of their accrued sick 
leave for health insurance does not necessarily mean that it 
could not operate as an effective incentive program.. 
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566 Individuals routinely assume some degree of risk in 
making life decisions, and there is no reason why employees would 
necessarily require an iron-clad guarantee before being motivated 
to reduce sick leave abuse. Nearly all aspects of compensation 
and retirement benefits in both the public and private sectors 
are offered as inducements to accept employment. But that does 
not mean that those benefits become immutable contractual 
guarantees as soon as an employee begins work or that any 
employee can reasonably expect that an employer will be offering 
the same benefits decades into the future. This principle is 
aptly illustrated by the fact that the pre-2004 iterations of the 
Option Program did not even include the option of exchanging the 
first 25% of accrued sick leave for health insurance. It is also 
illustrated by the majority's tacit assumption that the statutory 
purpose of reducing sick leave abuse is fulfilled by its 
construction of the statute—a construction that in practical 
effect differs not at all from the interpretation urged by the 
State and adopted by me. 
567 My plain language construction of the Option Program is 
bolstered by the language of title 49 of the Utah Code, which is 
referenced in the 2004 statute. Title 49 of the Utah Code 
consists of the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act. 
Chapter 11 of that act governs the administration of the system, 
while chapters 12 through 21 establish various retirement systems 
for specific classes of public employees. Although some of the 
specific provisions of these various systems differ, the 
statutory structure of each follows a similar pattern, and each 
is consistent with my conclusion that eligibility to receive 
retirement benefits can occur only when an employee elects to 
retire. 
568 First, each of the various systems distinguishes those 
employees who are merely eligible to participate in the 
retirement system from those employees who are eligible to 
receive an allowance from the system. Membership in the system 
is available to all "regular full-time employee[s] of a 
participating employer" and begins on "the effective date of 
employment." Utah Code Ann, § 49-12-201 (2002); see, e.g., id. 
§§ 49-13-201, 49-14-201 (Supp. 2005). "when the legislature 
referred to the class of employees eligible for participation in 
one of the state retirement systems, it used the phrase "eligible 
for service credit." Because eligibility for service credit 
differs from eligibility to receive retirement benefits, I reject 
the plaintiffs' contention that the phrase "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" could plausibly be interpreted to refer to 
all regular, full-time state employees. 
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569 I find the provisions of title 49 addressing 
eligibility to receive allowances particularly helpful. For 
example, Utah Code section 49-12-401 (2002) provides: 
(1) A member is qualified to receive an 
allowance from this system when: 
(a) the member ceases actual work 
for a participating employer in this 
system before the member's retirement 
date and provides evidence of the 
termination; 
(b) the member has submitted to the 
office a notarized retirement 
application form that states the 
member's proposed retirement date; and 
(c) one of the following conditions 
is met as of the member's retirement 
date: 
(i) the member has accrued 
at least four years of service 
credit and has attained an age of 
65; 
(ii) the member has accrued 
at least ten years of service 
credit and has attained an age of 
62 years; 
(iii) the member has accrued 
at least 20 years of service credit 
and has attained an age of 60 
years; or 
(iv) the member has accrued 
at least 30 years of service 
credit. 
Each of the various retirement acts comprising title 49 contains 
a similar provision. See, e.g., id. §§ 49-13-401, 49-14-401 
(Supp. 2005), 49-15-401 (2002). 
170 At first glance, because these provisions use the 
phrase "qualified to receive an allowance," they do not appear to 
clarify the meaning of the phrase "eligible to receive retirement 
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benefits" as used in section 67-19-14.2. But further examination 
of title 49 demonstrates that the legislature used the terms 
"allowance" and "retirement benefits" interchangeably. See, 
e.g., id. §§ 49-12-402(2) (Supp. 2005) (the "Option One benefit 
is an annual allowance"), 49-12-405, (4) (referring to Option 
Three allowance as "[s]ervice retirement benefits" and stating 
that "benefits payable under this section are retirement 
benefits"), 49-11-401(3)(b) ("[a]n allowance or other benefit"), 
49-11-405(3) (2002) (referring to a "member's allowance" as 
"benefit"). Moreover, the notion of being qualified or eligible 
to actually "receive" an allowance or benefit is common to both 
section 67-19-14.2 and section 49-12-401. They therefore support 
my conclusion that those employees who are "eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" must have satisfied the conditions 
specified by section 49-12-401 for receipt of an allowance. 
571 Justice Nehring opines that my conclusion in this 
regard is undercut by other provisions of title 49. In fact, 
however, much of his analysis improperly draws on sources 
extrinsic to the statutory language. He suggests that the phrase 
"eligible to receive retirement benefits" is distinct from the 
phrase "qualified to receive an allowance" by drawing a 
distinction between the terms "eligible" and "qualified."1 But 
this distinction stems from an inspection of the statutory 
language of pre-2004 versions of section 67-19-14. Prior to 
2004, the statute provided that "[a]n employee must be eligible 
for retirement benefits to qualify for the program." Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-14 (Supp. 1999). Because the predecessor versions 
of the 2004 statute used both "eligible" and "qualify," Justice 
Nehring concludes that these words cannot be ascribed the same 
meaning. He then suggests that, because legislative history 
indicates that the legislature did not wish to make substantive 
changes when passing the 2004 version of the statute, the 
reference to title 4 9 must have implicitly preserved the 
distinction found in prior iterations of the program. Finally, 
Justice Nehring construes "eligible to receive retirement 
benefits" to mean "eligible to retire." I pause to briefly 
respond to these contentions. 
112 First, we may not look to extrinsic aids to ascertain 
the meaning of a statute where the statute is plain on its face. 
Past versions of a statute and legislative history are 
1
 Plaintiffs have never urged the interpretation of the 2004 
statute articulated by Justice Nehring, a fact somewhat at odds 
with Justice Nehring's suggestion that his interpretation is 
driven by the "plain" language of the statute. 
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indisputably extrinsic aids. As such, they may be helpful in 
resolving an ambiguity, but they may not be employed to create 
one. As discussed above, the plain meaning of the statute is 
that an agency may not offer the Option Program to an employee 
until she elects to retire. Where the statutory meaning is 
plain, resort to past versions of the statute and legislative 
history is improper. Moreover, because the 2004 version of the 
statute does not use both "eligible" and "qualify," the dichotomy 
that Justice Nehring attempts to create between the two terms 
does not logically become an issue. 
SI73 In fact, the words "eligible" and "qualified" are 
synonymous, and our case law does not mandate a distinction 
between the two in the context of the Option Program. We have 
stated that we give effect to each term of a statute and assume 
that the legislature used each term advisedly. State v. Barrett, 
2005 UT 88, 1 29, P.3d . But this does not mean that we 
must, in all cases, ascribe competing meanings to synonymous 
terms found in the same statute. This is particularly true here 
where Title 49 uses the words "qualified," "eligible" and their 
variants interchangeably. Compare Utah Code Ann. 
§ 49-11-401(3) (c) (Supp. 2005) (instructing the-board to regulate 
how service credits should "be credited toward qualification for 
retirement" (emphasis added)), and id. § 49-11-403(1)(c) 
(providing that an employee may purchase service credits based on 
out-of-state public employment where she "does not qualify for 
any retirement benefits based on the employment" (emphasis 
added)), with id. § 49-11-404 (2) (d) (2002) (basing cost-of-living 
increase factor "on the date the member is eligible to receive 
benefits under a benefit protection contract" (emphasis added)). 
Therefore, while Justice Nehring concludes that the legislature 
used the word "qualify" rather than the phrase "be eligible" in 
pre-2004 iterations of the statute for the sole purpose of 
signaling that "eligible" means less than "legally qualified," I 
cannot make that inferential leap. 
574 More fundamentally. Justice Nehring defines "eligible" 
as "able to choose." But the prevailing definition of "eligible" 
is "qualified to be chosen." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary 374 (10th ed. 1998). If we insert this definition 
into the 2004 statute, it reads, "An agency may offer the [Option 
Program] to an employee who is [qualified to be chosen] to 
receive retirement benefits." Because the State may not require 
an employee to receive retirement benefits before the employee 
fulfills all the requirements of Utah Code section 49-12-401, 
including filing an application to retire, Justice Nehring's 
interpretation is unavailing. In other words, the State may not 
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require that an employee actually receive retirement benefits 
before the employee has applied for retirement. 
275 In addition to relying on prior versions of the 
statute, Justice Nehring relies on legislative history for the 
proposition that the 2004 amendment was not intended to make any 
substantive changes to the Program. But in the absence of 
ambiguity, reliance on legislative history is improper. And if 
the legislative history of the 2004 statute truly indicates no 
intent to make substantive changes to the Program, it is patently 
unreliable because plaintiffs' only claim arises as a result of a 
substantive change wrought by the 2004 amendment.2 Thus, Justice 
Nehring's conclusion that the phrase "qualify for the program" is 
functionally equivalent to the phrase "in accordance with Title 
49" in the 2004 statute has no basis. Indeed, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that the reference to title 49 in the 
2004 statute was intended to codify the pre-2004 regulation 
providing that "the decision to participate [in the Option 
Program] shall be made at retirement." Utah Admin. Code 
r.477-7-6(b) (2000). 
176 Justice Nehring also relies on other provisions of 
title 49. But none of these provisions establish the meaning of 
the phrase "eligible to receive retirement benefits." For 
example, Justice Nehring points to the definition of "retirement" 
contained in Utah Code section 49-11-102(34) (Supp. 2005). It 
defines "retirement" as the status of an individual who has 
"become eligible, applies for, and is entitled to receive an 
allowance." Because eligibility to receive an allowance is only 
one of three components of "retirement," Justice Nehring 
concludes that eligibility to receive retirement benefits must 
refer to a status distinct from retirement. I disagree because 
the other two components of retirement (becoming eligible to 
apply for retirement and filing a retirement application) are 
conditions that must necessarily be fulfilled before one is 
eligible to receive an allowance. Thus, the definition of 
"retirement" may, in fact, be coextensive with the final act 
2
 In actuality, the legislative history indicates that the 
legislature's intent was to conform the statute to agency 
practice. Audio recording: Senate Debate of H. Bill 11, 55th 
Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 26, 2004) available at 
http://le.utah.gov/asp/audio/index.asp?Sess=2004GS&Bill=HB0011&Da 
y=0&House=S ("[The 2004 amendment] codifies existing procedure 
. . . and the existing way that we use unused sick leave."). 
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necessary to effectuate retirement—eligibility to receive 
retirement benefits.3 
177 In summary, I believe that the only way to read section 
67-19-14.2 consistently with title 49 is to give "retirement 
benefits'7 the same meaning as "allowance." Therefore, section 
67-19-14.2 grants authority to an agency to offer the Option 
Program to only those employees who have (1) ceased actual work, 
(2) submitted an application to retire, and (3) attained the 
requisite age and accumulated the requisite number of service 
credits.. Given this construction of the statute, no public 
employee could have obtained a vested right in the Option Program 
prior to submitting an application to retire. In the absence of 
any vested rights, H.B. 213 cannot effect a taking. 
III. ASSUMING AN AMBIGUITY IN THE STATUTE, APPLICABLE 
CANONS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DICTATE THE SAME RESULT 
178 Were I to assume the ambiguity of the statute for 
argument/s sake, I would nevertheless reject plaintiffs' 
contention that the statute endowed employees with a vested right 
to exchange 100% of their accrued sick leave for health 
insurance. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the statutory 
history of the Program, the implementing regulations, and what I 
believe to be the applicable canon of statutory construction. 
17 9 There is a "well-established presumption'' that "absent 
some clear indication that the legislature intends to bind itself 
contractually, . . . xa law is not intended to create private 
contractual or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be 
pursued until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.'" Nat' 1 
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Rv. Co., 470 
3
 Justice Nehring also invokes sections 49-12-701 and 49-11-
103(2). Neither applies. While section 49-11-103(2) suggests 
that title 4 9 should be liberally construed to provide maximum 
benefits, it does not go so far as to suggest that it may be 
invoked to create an ambiguity or to countenance a construction 
inconsistent with the statutory language. It is also 
questionable whether it even applies at all to our attempt to 
construe the provisions the 2004 statute, which is found in a 
different title of the Utah Code. 
Section 49-12-701 is equally inapplicable. That section 
governed an early retirement program that has not been available 
since 1938. Its value in aiding our interpretation of the 2004 
statute is therefore suspect. 
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U.S. 451, 465-66 (1985) (citation omitted). In other words, when 
it is unclear whether a legislature intends to bind itself, a 
court should not infer such an intent. Cf. id. Because section 
67-19-14.2 lacks a "clear indication" that "the legislature 
intend[ed]" to bestow on state employees an irrevocable and 
unalterable property right to exchange 100% of their banked sick 
leave for health insurance, I would decline to find such a right. 
580 This conclusion is not only mandated by the applicable 
canon of statutory construction, it is consistent with the 
legislative intent. As described in the lead opinion, the 
various changes in the Program from 1979 to 2004 demonstrate that 
the legislature intended to reserve its ability to modify the 
menu of available benefits. The changes in the program since its 
inception are, in fact, persuasive evidence that the legislature 
did not intend to bind the State to forever redeem 100% of 
accrued sick leave for health insurance benefits. 
581 This conclusion is also consistent with the 
interpretation of the statute adopted by the Director of Human 
Resource Management in the applicable regulations. We previously 
have recognized that an agency's interpretation of a statute it 
administers may be given some weight. See McKniaht v. State Land 
Bd., 381 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1963). In this case, the director 
has effectively interpreted the provision at issue by 
promulgating rules that explicitly allow an agency to offer the 
Option Program to an employee only "[u]pon retirement." Utah 
Admin. Code r.477-7-6 (2005). And the regulations also provide 
that state agencies may opt in and out of the Program on an 
annual basis, a provision that is wholly inconsistent with the 
claim of a vested contractual right at any point prior to an 
employee's election to retire. See id. Inasmuch as the 
regulatory interpretation is abundantly reasonable and consistent 
with the statutory language, I believe it should be given 
considerable weight. 
CONCLUSION 
182 Although I agree with the result reached by the 
majority, my reasoning differs. I conclude that both a plain 
meaning analysis and an analysis that assumes ambiguity lead to 
the conclusion that the 2004 statute empowered agencies to offer 
the Option Program to employees only upon retirement. Because 
the offer to participate in the Program could not be made until 
an employee elected to retire, plaintiffs have no vested 
contractual right to exchange 100% of their accrued sick leave 
for health insurance. 
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NEHRING, Justice, concurring: 
183 I join Justice Wilkins's review of the statutory and . 
procedural background of this case and note in particular my 
agreement with his cautionary remarks about perceived attempts to 
intrude on the constitutional obligations of this court to be the 
independent voice of the rule of law under our form of 
government. I also agree with Justice Wilkins that the 
plaintiffs have standing to bring their facial challenge to H.B. 
213 and that their facial challenge fails. I therefore concur in 
the analysis of Part I and in the result of Part 11(1), as well 
as with its conclusion that the language concerning the meaning 
of "eligibility to receive retirement benefits" in H.B. 213's 
predecessor statute is ambiguous. 
184 Like Justice Parrish, I conclude that the statute that 
H.B. 213 supplanted survives facial attack on the strength of the 
presumption that the legislature cannot be bound unless it 
manifests a clear intention to create or vest a private property 
right. I find it unnecessary, however, to set out on a trek into 
the uncharted terrain of extrinsic evidence in the hope of 
resolving the ambiguity that infests the 2004 amendment to 
section 67-19-14.2, nor would I reach the question of whether the 
State undertook a voluntary obligation. 
585 Although the lead opinion makes a persuasive case for 
the ambiguity of section 67-19-14.2, the close textual exegesis 
offered by Justice Parrish to defend her view that the statute 
plainly and unambiguously conditions "eligibility to receive 
retirement benefits" on actual retirement compels me to respond 
with a text-based analysis of my own that reaches the contrary 
result. 
186 The portion of the text of the 2004 version of section 
67-19-14.2 that bears on the question of whether the statute 
created a property right in the Option reads as follows: 
(1) (a) There is created the "Unused Sick 
Leave Retirement Option Program." 
(b) An agency may offer the Unused Sick 
Leave Retirement Option Program to an 
employee who is eligible to receive 
retirement benefits in accordance with 
Title 49, Utah State Retirement and 
Insurance Benefit Act. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(1)(a) & (b) (2004). 
587 According to Justice Parrish, this provision cannot 
create a property right in the Option because an agency that 
chooses to adopt the Option program does not offer it to an 
employee until the employee has retired. This is not, of course, 
an interpretation that can be harvested from the plain language 
of the statute. An "employee who is eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" to whom the employer agency offers the 
Option need not necessarily be an employee who has retired. 
Indeed, it is plausible, and in my view probable, that the phrase 
is meant both to disqualify employees excluded or exempted from 
participation in one of the State's retirement systems, such as 
temporary employees, see, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-203 
(2002), and to make the offer available to employees who have 
satisfied the age and service requirements for retirement but who 
have not yet retired. 
188 It is therefore clear that Justice Parrish's contention 
that the Option cannot be offered to an employee until the 
employee has retired must derive from the phrase "in accordance 
with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act." 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14.2(1) (b) . Although, as the lead opinion 
notes, Title 49 is comprised of eight parts and forty-four 
statutory sections, Justice Parrish relies exclusively on certain 
portions of Title 49 while overlooking others to make her case 
that the Option is offered to an employee only upon retirement. 
589 Justice Parrish reasons that the clause "in accordance 
with" that links the phrase "an employee who is eligible to 
receive benefits" with "Title 49" means that Title 49 should be 
canvassed for a provision that offers a supplemental definition 
for just who "an employee who is eligible to receive benefits" 
might be. Justice Parrish believes she struck pay dirt in 
section 49-12-401 because that section details the status of an 
employee who "is qualified to receive an allowance from this 
system." According to Justice Parrish, such an employee is the 
same employee described as one "who is eligible to receive 
retirement benefits" in section 67-19-14.2 (1) (b) . Since the 
employee described in section 49-12-401 must have satisfied both 
the age and service condition for retirement and formally applied 
to retire, Justice Parrish urges us to import formal retirement 
into section 67-19-14.2(1)(b) as a condition precedent to 
becoming an offeree of the Option. Two fundamental flaws 
undermine her reasoning. 
590 First, Justice Parrish's premise that the reference to 
Title 49 in section 67-19-14.2(1)(b) inevitably compels the 
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importation of the restrictive formal retirement requirement of 
section 49-12-401 is erroneous. A review of the text of the 
version of section 67-19-14 that the 2004 amendment modified 
discloses why. That iteration of the conversion options 
available for unused sick leave states that M[a]n employee must 
be eligible for retirement benefits to qualify for the program.'' 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(1)(a)(iv) (1999). 
191 This is a phrase that is less susceptible to competing 
interpretations than its 2004 successor. It communicates the 
unambiguous message that if a State agency offers a program that 
permits agency employees to convert their unused sick leave, an 
employee who has met the age and service requirements for 
retirement but who has not yet formally retired may participate. 
In fact, this language likely excluded employees who had, for 
example, retired before the genesis of an unused sick leave 
conversion program in 1975. 
592 The phrase "[a]n employee must be eligible for 
retirement benefits to qualify for this program" has enjoyed an 
enduring presence within section 67-19-14. It first appeared in 
1983. In that year, the legislature amended the unused sick 
leave conversion provision to accommodate the legislature' s 
desire to supplement the original rationale for providing 
employees the opportunity to convert unused sick leave into 
health and medical insurancer that is, the reduction of sick 
leave abuse, with an incentive for state employees to retire 
early, with the goal of controlling the growth of the state 
workforce.1 Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-14(2)(d). It was preserved 
when the statute was amended in 1998 and again in 1999. Did the 
2004 amendment to section 67-19-14 result in a substantive change 
to pare back the class of those employees qualified to 
participate in the program to employees who had provided formal 
notice of retirement? No. 
593 Neither the sponsor of the 2004 amendment nor anyone 
who rose in the legislature to speak to the merits of the 
amendment indicated that it would bring about any modification of 
the substance of the pre-amendment language. Yet, the State's 
reading of the 2004 amendment requires a dramatic interpretive 
shift to a meaning squarely at odds with the legislative history. 
This alone does not make the State's interpretation wrong. 
1
 The early retirement program that was created by the 1983 
amendments and which at that time was grafted onto section 67-19-
14 was disconnected from the unused sick leave provisions and 
recodified in Title 49. Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-70L. 
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Indeed, the legislative history of the amendment would be 
irrelevant if it proved to be at odds with the unambiguous plain 
meaning of its text. The 2004 amendment can, however, be read to 
conform its interpretation to the plain meaning of its 
predecessor eligibility language acknowledging that an employee 
acquired a property right in her unused sick leave without the 
need to submit formal notice of an intent to retire. 
594 The central alteration made by the 2004 amendment to 
the then-existing eligibility language was the replacement of the 
concluding phrase "to qualify for the program" with "in 
accordance with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance 
Benefit Act." The concept of eligibility is not, however, 
displaced by the amending language. This is important. Even if 
we were to limit our inspection of Title 49 to the sections cited 
by Justice Parrish, we would nevertheless not be free to ignore 
the text of section 67-19-14.2(1) (b) that expressly renders the 
Option available to an employee "who is eligible to receive 
retirement benefits." (emphasis added). 
195 It is significant that the pre-2004 statutes contained 
both the words "eligible" and "qualify." These two words persist 
in the 2004 amendment, but in an altered context. Because 
"eligible" and "qualify" appear prominently in every 
configuration of statutes relating to retirement, we take a 
closer look at them. The pre-2004 phrase "[a]n employee must be 
eligible for retirement benefits to qualify for the program" may 
be broken down into two components, one assembled around 
"eligible," and the other around "qualify." We start with the 
first half of the phrase, "[a]n employee must be eligible for 
retirement benefits." There is no ambiguity in this phrase, and 
thus no occasion to turn to extrinsic sources to divine its 
meaning. We first observe that "eligible" is a word brimming 
with potential. That is, to be eligible, one may be desirable, 
fully capable of choosing or being chosen, but still uncommitted. 
Just as a bachelor is eligible to marry by choosing to do so, 
eligibility is defined by the ultimate choice or step a party 
must complete in order to realize the matter. This is why a boy 
who is under the legal marriage age is not yet eligible to 
marry—there is no decision or step that the boy can make or take 
to allow him to marry. So it is with the issue now before us. 
An employee is eligible for retirement benefits when there exists 
an election that she can make to start benefits flowing. Such a 
point could not be on the employee's first day of work— 
presumably there is nothing the employee could do at that point 
to start to receive retirement benefits. However, without more 
information, we cannot be certain that the new employee is 
ineligible to receive retirement benefits because nothing in the 
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statute explicitly states at what point an employee can choose to 
begin receiving those benefits. All the pre-2004 statute told us 
is that an employee must be eligible to "qualify for the 
program." 
596 The most logical interpretation of the link between 
"eligible" and "qualify" is that the right to elect to receive 
retirement benefits—to be eligible for those benefits—is one, 
but not necessarily the only, requirement to access the program. 
597 Therefore, it must be established when an employee 
would be qualified. The best answer is found in section 49-12-
401, which tells us when a member is qualified to receive a 
retirement allowance. In essence, this section states that 
someone is qualified to receive an allowance when she has accrued 
a specified number of service credits and attained a certain age, 
and then ceased work and filled out the requisite paperwork. 
Therefore, one must ask, how can an employee become eligible to 
qualify? As discussed above, one is eligible when she can choose 
to effectuate the matter for which she is eligible. The only 
possible answer is that she is eligible to qualify when she has 
accrued the mandatory service credits and age, so that she can 
choose, at her discretion, when to complete the qualification 
requirements by ceasing work and filling out the retirement 
paperwork. 
598 As mentioned above, the 2004 amendment to section 67-
19-14 was not intended to effectuate any substantive changes to 
the statute, but merely to clarify its substance. This 
description of the amendment is supported by what was done to 
section 67-19-14.2 (1) (b). There, the statute dropped "to qualify 
for the program" and replaced it with the language quoted above, 
"in accordance with Title 49, Utah State Retirement and Insurance 
Benefit Act." Where there may have been some initial doubt 
before as to where one could discover the qualifications for 
receiving the benefits provided by section 67-14-19, it was 
replaced with an explicit reference to Title 49. Of utmost 
importance is the fact that the term "eligible" remained in the 
statute while pointing to Title 49. The first line of section 
49-12-401 states that u[a] member is qualified to receive an 
allowance from this system when," and then outlines the 
requirements for qualification as discussed above. The key is 
that although the word "qualify" was removed from the text of 
section 67-19-14.2, it was preserved by the reference to Title 49 
which replaced it, and which begins by describing the 
qualification requirements. Therefore, the 2004 amendment must 
be read, as its predecessor read, that an agency can offer the 
program to an employee who is eligible to qualify for the 
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program—in other words, to someone who has accrued the service 
credits and attained the age outlined by section 49-12-401, but 
who has yet to effectuate that eligibility by ceasing employment 
and filling out the retirement paperwork. 
199 This understanding is enforced by a more in-depth look 
at Title 49. Justice Parrish's refusal to consider all the 
provisions of Title 49 severely undercuts her contention that an 
employee is not eligible to receive retirement benefits under 
section 67-19-14.2(1)(b) until she submits a formal application 
to retire. Taken as a whole, the content of Title 49 leads to 
the inexorable conclusion that an employee acquires a property 
interest in unused sick leave when she satisfies the age and 
service requirements for retirement. Section 49-11-102(34) 
defines "retiree" as "an individual who has qualified for an 
allowance under this title." This definition is in complete 
harmony with section 49-12-401 which, in sub-parts (b) and (c), 
requires the submission of a formal application to retire and 
satisfaction of age and service requirements before " [a] member 
is qualified to receive an allowance from this system." Put 
another way, the "member" in section 49-12-401 is a "retiree" as 
defined in section 49-11-102(34). It is obvious that not every 
"employee eligible to receive retirement benefits" is a retiree, 
yet under Justice Parrish's statutory interpretation, they must 
be. 
5100 Title 49's definition of "retirement" further exposes 
the weakness of Justice Parrish's invocation of section 49-12-
401. Section 49-11-102(35) states that "'Retirement' means the 
status of an individual who has become eligible, applies for, and 
is entitled to receive an allowance under this title." Under 
this definition, the "member" identified in section 49-12-401 who 
is "qualified to receive an allowance" is a "retiree" as defined 
in Title 49 and has also entered the realm of "retirement" 
because she has met the three conditions for retirement: she has 
become eligible for retirement, she has applied for retirement, 
and she is entitled to receive an allowance. It is clear from 
the definition of retirement that eligibility to receive 
retirement benefits is a status different than retirement. 
Because the status defined as "retirement" is achieved by 
complying with the requirements of section 49-12-401 to file a 
formal application for retirement and to satisfy the age and 
service standards, and because mere eligibility to receive 
retirement benefits satisfies but one of the three elements of 
"retirement," an employee must logically be capable of being 
eligible to receive retirement benefits without filing a formal 
application to retire. 
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1101 Section 49-12-701 underscores the point that under 
Title 49 an employee's eligibility to receive retirement benefits 
does not require an employee to file a formal application to 
retire. Title 49 defines the eligibility for and the benefits of 
early retirement. Section 49-12-701(1)(a) makes early retirement 
available if "the member is eligible for retirement under Section 
49-12-401, or has 25 years of service credit." The only 
reasonable interpretation of this provision is that the right to 
choose to become a retiree under section 49-12-401, in other 
words to become "eligible" for retirement, is separate and 
independent from actually electing to retire and undertaking the 
tasks—most notably the submission of a formal application for 
retirement—necessary to make the employee "qualified to receive 
an allowance" under section 49-12-401. 
1102 Finally, Justice Parrish fails to explain why section 
49-11-103(2) should be excluded from the provisions of Title 49 
that should be considered under the "in accordance" directive of 
section 67-19-14.2. This section states that "[Title 49] shall 
be liberally construed to provide maximum benefits and 
protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial 
principals [sic]." 
5103 While I have considerable confidence in the correctness 
of this textual interpretation, I do not discount the legitimacy 
of Justice Parrish's closely reasoned approach. I therefore stop 
short of asserting that my interpretation has won the day and 
that section 67-19-14.2 should be crowned with my reading as its 
sole, unambiguous reading. I am, instead, content to pursue the 
more modest objective of reinforcing the lead opinion's claim 
that the statute is ambiguous. 
1104 Having offered up my interpretation of the statute 
central to this appeal, I turn to interpreting the law that 
governs how an ambiguous statute that purports to create a vested 
private property right should be evaluated when confronted by a 
facial challenge to its constitutionality. The key feature of 
this law is the policy-based principle that the legislative 
branch should be free to respond to the changing needs and will 
of the people. The law acknowledges the fundamental need for 
legislative flexibility and accountability when it imposes more 
rigorous demands on those who would claim that the legislature 
has bound itself by statute to duties and obligations that may 
mature in the future to demonstrate with particular clarity the 
legislature's intent to assume such future duties. 
Owing to the unique policy considerations that attend to 
commitments made by the legislature, I would end the facial-
challenge inquiry into whether a statute creates a vested 
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property right upon a finding that the statute is ambiguous. It 
is unnecessary and contrary to the presumption against the 
creation of statutorily-vested property interests to. take the 
next step typically taken when confronted with statutory 
ambiguity and examine extrinsic evidence, most notably 
legislative history, for guidance on the intent of the statute. 
5105 I hasten to add that although in this instance the 
State is rewarded for successfully enacting a statute remarkable 
for its impenetrability (during the course of this appeal I have 
mused over how a lawyer who might have been visited by a state 
employee in late 2004 would have responded to her request for an 
opinion concerning the status of her unused sick leave), any 
legislative body that chooses to adopt .as a strategy the notion 
that there is victory in opacity would, besides betraying the 
trust of the people, find that outside the context of a facial 
challenge to a statute, ambiguity would offer scant defense 
against the claim of a vested property right, 
5106 The voluntary undertaking exception to the presumption 
against the statutory creation of vested property rights provides 
parties who believe that they have sustained damage through the 
unconstitutional deprivation of a statutorily-conferred property 
right the opportunity for redress under circumstances where no 
statute clearly creates that right. Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 
78, 99 P.3d 842. The lead opinion suggests that such a voluntary 
undertaking must supplement an expressly-created statutory 
obligation. This does not go far enough. Correctly understood, 
the exception includes the use of evidence of a voluntary 
undertaking to resolve a statutory ambiguity that bears on the 
existence and scope of a claimed vested property right. In this 
setting, evidence of a voluntary undertaking would be identical 
in its form and purpose to extrinsic evidence that we call upon 
routinely to aid in the resolution of statutory ambiguities. 
This formulation of the exception would thereby compliment my 
central proposition that the presence of ambiguity itself should 
defeat a claim that a statute has conferred a vested property 
right. 
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